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Conflict analysis tools are applied to brownfield negotiations in order to 
investigate the impacts of coalition formation and a decision maker’s (DM’s) attitudes 
upon the successful resolution of brownfield disputes.  The concepts of attitudes within 
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is defined and subsequently are used, 
along with coalition analysis methods, to examine the redevelopment of the Kaufman 
Lofts property and the resolution of a post-development dispute involving Eaton’s Lofts, 
both located in downtown Kitchener, Ontario, Canada. Within the model of the Kaufman 
Lofts redevelopment, the project is broken down into three connected project conflicts: 
property acquisition, remediation selection and redevelopment; with the graph model 
applied to all three conflict nodes. The application of attitudes shows the impact of 
cooperation between local governments and private developers in the formation of a 
coalition that mutually benefits all parties. Coalition analysis, applied to the 
redevelopment selection conflict between Heritage Kitchener and the private developer in 
the Kaufman Lofts project, illustrates the importance of close collaboration between the 
local government and the developer. Systems methodologies implemented here for the 
examination of brownfield redevelopments are examined and contrasted with the 
economic and environmental tools commonly used in the redevelopment industry. 
Furthermore, coalition formation within GMCR is used to examine the negotiation of the 
Kyoto Protocol, to demonstrate that formal conflict resolution methods can be utilized in 
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Brownfield properties, defined by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA) as being abandoned, idled and potentially contaminated, are both a 
problem and a point of interest for urban centers around the world (USEPA, 1997). 
Although brownfields may be associated with reduced human health and environmental 
quality, higher crime rates, and carry a stigma seen by developers, citizens and local 
government, they also provide opportunities for reducing urban sprawl, improving human 
health and environmental conditions and increasing tax revenue to the local government 
(Greenberg, et al., 1998; DeSousa, 2003). With the opportunity to improve the social, 
environmental and economic conditions of an urban center, it is no wonder that 
municipal and city governments are clamouring to redevelop these unused properties. 
However, finding developers willing to undertake the considerable financial and legal 
risks of purchasing and developing brownfield land requires skilled negotiation. This is, 
of course, coupled with a need to meet the Ontario Ministry of the Environment’s 
(MOE’s) regulations for human and environmental exposure to contaminants. Satisfying 
the preferences of developers, local government, provincial and federal ministries and 
citizens requires the ability to foresee the repercussions of the actions each decision 
maker (DM) takes and thus benefits from the application of a conflict analysis tool. 
Conflict, often arising as a result of a difference in values between multiple DMs, 
is a common aspect of everyone’s personal and professional lives. Further, conflicts 
between disparate social and political groups are responsible for the vast majority of 
social change, be it positive or negative, in modern society. Many of these conflicts, such 
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as labour negotiations, project management disputes and military deployment (Kilgour 
and Hipel, 2005), are studied in the field of conflict analysis. Regardless of the type of 
conflict being analyzed, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) can be used 
to gain insights into the potential moves and resolutions available DMs in present and 
potential future conflicts or to provide historical analyses of past conflicts (Fang et al., 
1993). Although the Elmira groundwater conflict (Hipel et al., 1993) and the Garrison 
Diversion Unit (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) are examples of environmental conflicts that 
have been analyzed previously using GMCR, brownfield conflicts represent a distinct 
conflict that has not been analyzed without strategic conflict tools. Brownfield conflicts 
are investigated herein such that the interactions that take place between developers, local 
government and other DMs can be better understood and paths towards better conflict 
resolutions can be determined. 
The application of GMCR allows complicated strategic conflicts to be modelled 
in a straightforward, precise manner that permit DMs’ interactions be examined. The goal 
of this is to allow for better judgement and hopefully more positive conflict outcomes 
that are beneficial for all of the involved DMs. In order to accomplish these tasks, the 
decision model requires information about each DM’s options and preferences over all 
the feasible states in the conflict model. These preferences, as well as attitudes (Inohara, 
et al., 2007) can be used to define each DM’s objectives in a given conflict and 
contributes to the final outcome. 
1.2 Motivation for Brownfield and Environmental Management Research 
The management of brownfield properties is a complex task involving multiple 
DMs each with goals that may conflict. Previous methodologies (Sounderpandian, et al., 
2005; Witlox, 2005) have focused on the financial and ecological impacts on brownfield 
decision making whilst the strategic interactions between stakeholders in these conflicts 
have largely been ignored. The use of systems methodologies, such as GMCR, fits 
naturally to the problem of completing brownfield redevelopment projects with multiple 
DMs with contrasting objectives and backgrounds. 
Private brownfield redevelopment projects can be analyzed as three separate 
conflicts; property acquisition, remediation and redevelopment. With the division of the 
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complex problem of brownfield revitalization projects, the system is simplified into a set 
of manageable conflicts that are more easily understood and analyzed. GMCR, applied to 
these three conflicts, provides insights into how local governments can entice 
development and how developers can work to avoid issues with heritage committees, 
building inspectors and so forth. 
 International environmental management conflicts, such as the Garrison 
Diversion Unit conflict analysed by Fraser and Hipel (1984), typically contain multiple 
DMs acting with different goals and options towards the resolution of problems that 
involve environmental stewardship, politics and economics. One such problem, the 
Kyoto Protocol conflict between Russia, the European Union and the United States of 
America is analysed using new coalition analysis tools developed by Inohara and Hipel 
(2008a, 2008b). 
The aforementioned conflicts are herein analyzed using GMCR, the systems tool 
which provides the theoretical basis for this thesis. The methodology relies heavily on the 
preference rankings assigned to each DM, with each preference ranking based on the 
principle that each DM prefers to improve their own lot, while holding indifference 
towards the improvements of all other DMs. However, if DMs hold either positive or 
negative attitudes towards each other, they may act against these preferences to create 
new conflict outcomes. Thus, the motivation behind this aspect of the research is to 
investigate the impacts of attitudes upon conflict outcomes. The application of attitudes 
to GMCR is not just of theoretical interest, as negative attitudes are common, especially 
in international conflicts and labour negotiations and positive attitudes are an essential 
part of coalition and team building, covered in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
1.2.1 Objective 
The overall objective is to employ formal approaches for analysing attitudes and 
coalitions within the paradigm of the graph model for conflict resolution in order to 
investigate the strategic consequences of attitudes and cooperation in brownfield 
redevelopment and other areas of environmental management. To accomplish this, the 
redevelopment of the Kaufman Shoe Factory in downtown Kitchener, Ontario, Canada is 
analysed as three distinct conflicts using attitudes and coalitions within GMCR, while the 
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post-development conflict surrounding the Eaton’s Lofts project is also analyzed using 
attitudes. Finally, a strategic analysis of the Kyoto Protocol examines the impact of 
coalition movements upon the resolution of an international environmental management 
conflict. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Herein, this thesis contains four main sections. In the second section, comprising 
Chapters 2 and 3, the Graph Model for Conflict Analysis, Coalition Analysis and 
Attitudes within the graph model are defined and examples of each are shown. These two 
chapters comprise the theoretical portion of the thesis. In Chapters 4 and 5 which 
constitute the third section, Chapter 4 provides a thorough review of brownfield literature 
describing the various types of decision support available to DMs in the area of 
brownfield management and redevelopment.  Within Chapter 5, GMCR is applied to two 
redevelopment projects, the Kaufman Lofts and Eaton’s Lofts in downtown Kitchener, 
Ontario, Canada. In Chapters 6 is a further application of the methodologies described in 
Chapters 2 and 3, rounding out the third section. Additionally, the fourth section, Chapter 
7 provides a summary of the findings of this research. Figure 1.1 more clearly shows this 
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Conflict is common to many types of human interaction and is often driven by a 
difference in goals or values (Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Fang, et al., 1993; Hipel and 
Obeidi, 2004). Thus, the study of conflict is useful for determining better courses of 
action when multiple stakeholders are involved. Whether it be negotiations regarding the 
Kyoto Protocol or the purchase of contaminated property within a city, the interactions 
between the various decision makers (DMs) can lead conflicts towards positive 
resolutions that are beneficial to all or towards negative, even catastrophic results. 
A range of conflict analysis tools have been proposed to model the real life 
actions of DMs under conflict and the vast majority find their bases in game theory. The 
work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 entitled “Theory of Games and 
Economics” is considered to be the founding text of this branch of conflict research. 
Howard (1971) furthered the concepts of Von Neumann and Morgenstern with the 
development of metagames and also drama theory (Howard, 1990) which breaks 
conflicts into three acts, similar to a drama. Fraser, Hipel and del Monte (1983) compared 
and contrasted four methods of conflict analysis that were available at the time and noted 
that metagame analysis had an advantage over previous game theoretic models due to its 
flexible modeling capabilities that allow it to be applied to practical conflict situations. 
Within the framework of metagames, Howard (1971) developed solution concepts related 
to whether a conflict outcome is stable for a given DM and labelled states as being 
rational, symmetric, general metarational or unstable. These solution concepts were 
developed under the assumption that a DM under conflict has knowledge only of whether 
a state is more preferred, equally preferred or less preferred by the DM with respect to 
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another state (Fraser, Hipel and del Monte, 1983).  This information and the concepts of 
reactions or movements between states allows for meaningful analyses to be carried out 
such that outcome stability can be determined. Howard’s other major contribution to the 
area of conflict resolution was drama theory (Howard, 1990) in which conflicts are 
broken down into different acts, as in a play or drama. 
In 1984, Fraser and Hipel (1979; 1984), extended metagame analysis by 
introducing additional solution concepts including sequential stability and simultaneous 
sanctioning as well as the tableau form to carry out stability calculations. Sequential 
sanctioning allowed for the consideration of credible solutions in which a sanction DM 
will not harm himself or herself in the process of levying a sanction. In 1993, Fang, Hipel 
and Kilgour developed the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) which 
provides a useful structure for recording the movements and countermoves of the various 
DMs and defining solution concepts. Within the graph model, a set of arcs represents the 
potential movements between vertices which stand for different conflict outcomes or 
states. The simple algorithm, depicted in Figure 2.1, is used to apply GMCR in the two 
main steps, consisting of modelling and analysis.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the implementation of GMCR is motivated by a 
real-world conflict which is then modelled. From a careful examination of the conflict, 
 
Figure 2.1. Implementation of GMCR 
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DMs who have direct impact on the conflict are determined. The options available to 
these DMs are ascertained and from these options a set of feasible states are created. The 
total set of states consists of all combinations of options as selected by all the involved 
DMs. Feasible states represent an important subset of the total set and include all states 
formed by feasible combinations of options. The allowable state transitions, determined 
from background research of the conflict being analyzed are used to determine how the 
different DMs can move between states. Finally, relative preferences are determined 
from historical data or information provided directly by the DMs. If the preferences are 
ordinal the feasible states are ranked from most to least preferred, where ties are allowed. 
Moreover, cardinal preferences can also be handled by the graph model, since ordinal 
preference information is contained within the cardinal structures. After these steps have 
been completed, solution concepts are applied to the model to determine individual 
stabilities for each DM at each state. Using these stability results, states that are stable for 
every DM involved in the conflict are determined and labelled as being equilibrium states 
(Fang, et al., 1993).  
There are numerous advantages to the application of GMCR in strategic decision 
support. GMCR is a very flexible framework for conflict analysis which can support 
various kinds of information about DMs, preferences and options. The graph model can 
be applied using both transitive and intransitive preference information as ranking 
information used for determining stability is used relative to a starting state. Because all 
transitive preferences can be handled by the model, cardinal utility values that express a 
DM’s preferences for different states are not necessary as in classical game theoretic 
methods but can still be taken care of by the model (Fang et al., 1993).  Additionally, 
intransitivities can be modelled within GMCR. GMCR can also accommodate different 
types of moves including reversible, irreversible and common moves. Reversible moves 
refer to options that, if selected by a DM, can be unselected by that same DM while 
irreversible moves refer to moves that once selected, cannot be undone. A common move 
refers to the situation where multiple DMs can make unilateral moves from the same 
starting state to the same final state (Fang, et al., 1993).  
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2.2 Graph Model Definitions 
The following definitions, developed by Kilgour, et al. (1987) and Fang, et al. 
(1993), are used to precisely layout the framework of the graph model including DMs’ 
moves and countermoves, as well as the application of solution concepts within the 
model.  
Definition 1 (The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution): A graph model for 
conflict resolution is a 4-tuple (N, S, (Ai) Ni∈ , ( if , ~i) Ni∈ ), where N: the set of all decision 
makers (DMs) (|N| ≥  2), S: the set of all states in the conflict (|S| ≥  2), (S, Ai): DM i’s 
graph (S: the set of all vertices, Ai ⊂  S×S: the set of all arcs such that (s, s)∉Ai for all s 
∈  S and all i ∈  N), and (
if , ~i): DM i’s preferences on S. 
For s, t ∈  S, s 
if  t means that DM i prefers state s to t, while s ~i t indicates that 
DM i is indifferent between s and t. Relative preferences are assumed to satisfy the 
following properties:  
if  is asymmetric; hence, for all s, t ∈  S, s if   t and t if  s cannot hold true 
simultaneously. 
~i is reflexive; therefore, for any s ∈  S, s  ~i  s. 
~i is symmetric; hence, for any s,  t ∈  S if s ~i  t then t  ~i  s. 
(
if , ~i) is complete; therefore, for all s, t ∈  S one of s if  t, t if  s or s  ~i  t is true. 
In Definition 1, the arcs between states represent the set of unilateral movements 
that a DM has between those states. Given this mathematical foundation and in order to 
define solution concepts for analyzing conflicts, the reachable list and unilateral 
improvement list are defined.  
In order to adequately describe the ways that DMs move and interact under 
conflict it is necessary to create sets that define DM strategies and options. The symbol 
φ is used to represent three separate sets of states based on DM preferences where: 
)(si
+φ represents the set of states preferred by DM i to state s,  
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)(si
−φ represents the set of states less preferred by DM i to state s, and  
)(si
=φ represents the set of states that are equally preferred by DM i to state s.  
An adaption of this, given in Definition 7, is used to accommodate the set of less 
than or equally preferred states. 
Unilateral movements (UM) make up the reachable list from a given state.  Let 
Ss∈  and φ≠⊂ HNH , . A UM from s by H , a member of RH(s), is defined inductively 
by: 
i) if Hi∈ and )(1 sRs i∈ , then )(1 sRs H∈   and ),( 1ssi HΩ∈ .. 
ii) if )(1 sRs H∈ , Hj∈ and )( 12 sRs j∈ , then 
a) if 1),( 1 =Ω ssH  and ),( 1ssj HΩ∉ , then )(2 sRs H∈ and ),( 2ssj HΩ∈  
b) if 1),( 1 >Ω ssH , then )(2 sRs H∈  and ),( 2ssj HΩ∈  
To determine RH(s), i) adds states that are UMs from state s by all DMs in H, 
while ii) adds those other states that can be attained via sequences of “joint moves” by 
some or all DMs in H. In the latter case, it is necessary to screen out sequences 
containing consecutive moves by any DM. This is achieved by distinguishing 
1),( 1 =Ω ssH  from 1),( 1 >Ω ssH : if  there is only one DM in who can move to s1, a state 
)( 12 sRs j∈ , Hj∈ is a member of RH(s) if and only if ij ≠ ; if there are two or more 
DMs who can make a move from s1 to a state )( 12 sRs j∈  , i.e., 1),( 1 >Ω ssH , then any 
state )( 12 sRs j∈ , Hj∈ can be added to RH(s) because there exists a sequence from s to 
s1 in which the last move is not made by j. The set RH(s) can be regarded as the reachable 
list of H, in that all states in RH(s) can be achieved by some or all DMs in H without 
participation of any DM in N-H . 
When assessing the stability of a state for a given DM, it is necessary to examine 
possible responses by other DMs. In a two-DM model, the opponent is a single DM, 
while in an n-DM model with n>2, the opponents are a group of two or more DMs. To 
extend the stability definitions in Section III-A to n-DM models, the definition of 
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countermoves by a group must be introduced first. Let NH⊂  be a nonempty subset of all 
DMs. A UM by a group of DMs is defined by a legal sequence of UMs, defined below, 
by individual DMs in the group. In a legal sequence, a DM may move more than once, 
but not consecutively. Let RH(s) denote the set of all states that can be reached through 
any legal sequence of UMs from state s by some or all DMs in H. If )(1 sRs H∈ , let  
),( 1ssHΩ be the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1. 
Definition 2 (Reachable list): For i∈N and s∈S, DM i’s reachable list from state 
s is the set {t∈S | (s, t)∈Ai}, denoted by Ri(s) ⊂  S. The reachable list is a record of all the 
states that a given DM can reach from a specified starting state in one step. In the graph 
model, all states that are joined by an arc Ai beginning at state s, are part of the DM i's 
reachable list from s. A more complete, inductive definition for reachable lists follows: 
Definition 3 (Unilateral Improvement (UI) list for a DM): For i∈N and s∈S, 
DM i’s UI list from state s is the set {t ∈  Ri(s) | st if }, denoted by SsRi ⊂+ )( . The UI list 
is a subset of the reachable list and includes all states which are more preferred than the 
starting state for DM i. More inductively, UI lists are defined as the intersection of a 
reachable list as defined in Definition 2 and the set of more preferred states. This can be 
expanded to include the sets Ri-(s) and Ri=(s) in a similar manner, representing the set of 
unilateral disimprovements and the set of equally preferred reachable states as follows:  
)()()( sRssR iii ∩=
++ φ : all unilateral improvements for DM i from state s 
)()()( sRssR iii ∩=
−− φ : all unilateral disimprovements for DM i from state s and 
)()()( sRssR iii ∩=
== φ : all equally preferred states reachable for DM i from state s 
 By applying Definition 1 through 3, it is possible to determine whether a state is 
stable using the concepts given in Definitions 4 through 10. These solution concepts are 
then used to determine the overall equilibrium states for the conflict. 
Definition 4 (Nash stability (Nash)): For i∈N, state s∈S is Nash stable for DM 
i, denoted by s ∈  NashiS , if and only if )(sRi
+  = φ .  Thus, Nash stability occurs when a 
DM has no UIs from a given state and thus is better off to remain at the state. 
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To define the next three solution concepts, movements under the control of DMs 
who are members of a set or coalition of DMs, H, must be defined. 
Definition 5 (Reachable list of a coalition): For H ⊂  N and s ∈  S, the reachable 
list of coalition H from state s is defined inductively as the set RH(s) that satisfies the two 
conditions: (i) if i∈H and t∈Ri(s), then t∈RH(s), and (ii) if i∈H and t∈RH(s) and u∈Ri(t), 
then u∈RH(s). 
Definition 6 (Unilateral improvement list of a coalition): For H ⊂  N and s ∈  
S, the strictly unilateral improvement list of coalition H from state s is defined 
inductively as the set RH+(s) that satisfies the two conditions: (i) if i∈H and t ∈  R+i(s), 
then t ∈  R+H(s), and (ii) if i ∈  H and t ∈  R+H(s) and u ∈  R+i(s), then u∈  R+H (s).  
Definition 7 (Set of less or equally preferred states):  For i∈N and s, x ∈  S, the 
set of all states that are less preferred or equally preferred to state s by DM i  is )(~ si
−φ  = 
{x ∈  S | s if  x}. 
Definition 8 (General metarationality (GMR)): For i∈N, state s∈S is general 
metarational for DM i, denoted by s∈ GMRiS , if and only if for all x∈  R
+
i(s), 
φφ ≠∩ − )(~}{\ sR iiN  
General Metarationality is a solution concept that can be used by a DM to 
determine a ‘worst case’ scenario for a particular state in the sense that the preferences of 
the sanctioning DMs are not taken into account.  Hence, opponents may make moves that 
appear not to be credible in order to block an improvement by the particular DM. 
Definition 9 (Symmetric metarationality (SMR)): For i∈N, state s∈S is 
symmetric metarational for DM i, denoted by s∈ SMRiS , if and only if for all x∈ )(sRi+ , 
there exists y∈ )()( ~}{\ sxR iiN −∩ φ such that )(~ sz i−∈φ  for all )( yRz i∈ . 
Symmetric metarationality looks three moves ahead.  First, the particular DM 
determines if a unilateral improvement can be sanctioned by opposing DMs, using either 
a credible or non-credible move.  Next, the DM seeks to find out if he or she can escape 
from this sanction.  If the opposing DMs can enforce a sanction and the DM cannot 
escape from it, than the state is said to be GMR stable.  If all possible unilateral 
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improvements by the DM from the new state can be blocked the state is stable according 
to symmetric metarationality. 
Definition 10 (Sequential stability (SEQ)):  For i ∈  N, state s ∈  S is 
sequentially stable for DM i, denoted by s∈ SEQiS , if and only if for all x∈ )(sRi+ , 
φφ ≠∩ −+ )()( ~}{\ sxR iiN  
Sequential sanctioning is a situation in which a DM will avoid moving 
unilaterally to a more improved state because an opposing DM can sanction the DM, 
moving the conflict to a less desired state for the particular DM.  In this case, the 
opposing DM will only sanction the initial DM using a ‘credible move’.   
After performing these various analyses, the goal is to provide some form of 
useful information to DMs who are taking part in the conflict. The information that is 
provided is dependent upon the type of solution concepts used to perform the stability 
analyses and thus different solution concepts can be applied, dependent upon the nature 
of the conflict being analyzed.  In Table 2.1 the amount of foresight and risk each of the 
solution concepts incorporates are listed. 
 
Non-myopic stability (Brams and Witman, 1981) and limited move stability 
(Zagare, 1984; Kilgour, 1985) solution concepts round out the remaining solution 
concepts by allowing for high and variable foresight while taking into account strategic 
disimprovements. Limited move stability examines multiple moves ahead in a conflict 
and is often completed by examining the potential evolution of a conflict with a tree 
diagram. At each state, potential movements by each DM are examined and compared to 
the status quo state. This analysis may be extended further to create a non-myopic 
Table 2.1. Properties of four key solution concepts within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
Solution Concept Original Reference Risk Foresight Disimprovements? 
Nash stability Nash (1950, 1951);  
van Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1953) 
Ignores risk low never 
Symmetric metarational Howard (1971) Avoids risk medium by opponents 
General metarional Howard (1971) Avoids risk medium by opponents 





Adapted from Kilgour, Fang and Hipel (1996) 
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analysis where DMs look more than a selected number of states ahead, but infinitely 
ahead in search of a stable state or states. 
2.3 Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, (Dresher, 1961; Flood, 1952; Rapoport and Chammah, 
1965) is a simple conflict between two prisoners who worked together on some illicit 
activity for which both are brought into a police station and interrogated separately. Each 
prisoner is told that if they turn in their accomplice that they will be set free and that their 
accomplice will get 10 years in prison, while if their accomplice turns them in then they 
will go to prison for 10 years and their accomplice will go free. Both prisoners know that 
if they don’t say anything to the police, they will receive a reduced sentence of 2 years as 
there is not enough evidence for the police to seek a greater charge. However, if they 
both confess with the expectation of being set free, they will both go to prison for 8 
years. In this conflict, each of the two DMs, prisoner 1 (P1) and prisoner 2 (P2) have the 
option to co-operate with each other and not talk to the police (C) or defect and confess 
to the police (D). The combinations of these two states creates a set, S, of all the feasible 
states in the conflict. For this given conflict, all of the states are feasible and thus the set S 
= { CC, CD, DC, DD } where the first letter of the state represents the action or strategy 
of P1 and the second letter of the state represents the action of P2. In order to generate 
these states or outcomes, it is convenient to use option form. Table 2.2 below shows how 
the various options chosen by P1 and P2 lead to different outcomes within the conflict.  
 
In Table 2.2, a ‘Y’ is used to denote that ‘yes’, a given outcome has been selected 
while ‘N’ is used to denote that ‘no’, a given option has not been selected. In Figure 2.2, 
an integrated graph model for both P1 and P2 are shown. Included with the graph in 
Figure 2.2 is an ordinal ranking of states from most to least preferred. 
Table 2.2. Prisoner’s Dilemma in option form 
DM Option     
Prisoner 1 Cooperate (C) Y N Y N 
 Defect (D) N Y N Y 
Prisoner 2 Cooperate (C) Y Y N N 
 Defect (D) N N Y Y 
State ID  CC DC CD DD 
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The vertical arrows between states CC and CD and states DC and DD represent 
the unilateral movements that are available to P2 in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Note here 
that each arrow has an arrowhead at the end; this is the graphical representation of a 
reversible move as defined previously. The horizontal arrows represent the reversible 
unilateral movements of P1. Applying Definitions 1 through 10, each state of the conflict 
can be analyzed to determine stability and associated equilibria. The result of the stability 
analysis is shown below in Table 2.3, using the solution concepts listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Applying the solution concepts, as shown in Table 2, it is possible to determine 
equilibrium states as well as analyze the impact that different solution concepts and thus 
different amounts of foresight and risk have on the equilibria to the conflict. Applying 
Nash, SEQ, SMR and GMR stabilities leads to only two unstable states and two 
equilibrium states. The two equilibria, CC and DD, correspond to the situations where 
both players Co-operate (CC) or Defect (DD). However, the solution concepts which 
give rise to the equilibria differ and thus the occurrences of these equilibria depend on the 
Table 2.3. Stability of four states in Prisoners’ Dilemma 
State Solution Concepts P1 Solution Concepts P2 Equilibria 
CC SEQ, GMR  SEQ, GMR Yes 
CD Unstable Nash, SEQ, GMR, SMR No 
DC Nash, SEQ, GMR, SMR Unstable No 







PP1 = {DC, CC, DD, CD} 
PP2 = {CD. CC. DD. DC} 
Figure 2.2. Integrated model of Prisoners’ Dilemma 
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level of risk taken by the DMs and the knowledge that the DMs have. State CC is GMR 
and SEQ stable but not Nash stable for both DMs. This implies that both DMs have UIs 
from CC but that these UIs can be sanctioned by the opposing DM. In the case of 
Prisoners’ Dilemma, the UI for both DMs at state CC would be to defect, in hopes of 
reducing their own penalty. By contrast, state DD is Nash stable for both DMs and thus 
there are no UIs from this state. Thus, at state DD, it is not an improvement for either 
prisoner to co-operate with the other. These solution concepts and the associated state 
stabilities in Prisoners’ Dilemma exhibit the strategic foresight that can lead the conflict 
from negative outcomes, such as DD, to positive mutually beneficial results like CC.  
It is also possible to illustrate this conflict in normal form (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) 
or tableau form (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). Normal form is very common in conflicts with 
two DMs each with two options, referred to as a two by two conflict. Table 2.4 below 
illustrates how Prisoners’ Dilemma would be modelled in normal form. 
 
In the normal form of Prisoners’ Dilemma, prisoner 1 (P1) has unilateral 
movements between the different rows by either cooperating (C) or defecting (D). 
Prisoner 2 (P2), on the other hand moves between different columns in the matrix by also 
cooperating or defecting. Each state in the conflict is formed by the combination of the 
prisoner’s potential selected options with the first letter representing P1’s strategy and the 
second letter representing P2’s strategy. For example, state DC corresponds to the 
outcome where P1 defects and P2 cooperates.  
Tableau form, developed by Fraser and Hipel (1984) to accommodate ordinal 
preference information in a geometric fashion gives conflict analysts a simple format 
which displays preferences and UIs. Often solution concepts for state stability and 
equilibria can be applied directly to the tableau giving a strong visual representation of 
the conflict and its potential outcomes. 
Table 2.4. Prisoners’ Dilemma in normal form 
 P2  
P1 C D 
C CC CD 




Using the tableau form in Table 2.5, it is easy to calculate the stabilities for each 
of the individual states, as previously defined. For example, as P1 has no UIs from states 
DC and DD, both states are Nash stable, by Definition 4.  As there is a UI from CC to 
DC, P2’s potential moves from this state must be analyzed in order to determine if the 
state satisfies any solution concepts for P1. From CC, P1 has a unilateral improvement, 
RP1+(CC) = DC, from which point P2 can move to DD as RP2(DC)=DD. As DD<P1CC, 
state CC is GMR stable by Definition 8 for P1. As P2’s movement from DC to DD is a 
UI, that is RP2+(DC)=DD, state CC is thus also SEQ stable by Definition 9. From 
Definition 10, CC is also SMR stable for P1 as after P2 moves from DC to DD, by the 
unilateral movement RP2(DC)=DD, P1 can only move to state CD as RP1(DD)=CD and 
CD<P1CC. 
2.4 Coalition Analysis 
The ability to obtain accurate analyses of problems, using information about how 
a DM will move and interact is an essential part of the GMCR framework. An important 
addition to this framework is the analysis of coalitions, which examines how groups of 
independent DMs may act as a coalition to obtain a better conflict outcome. Coalitions 
have been previously studied within previous game theoretic models. Aumann (1959) 
developed coalition models within game theoretic models, namely cooperative games. 
Kuhn, Hipel and Fraser (1983) first adapted the concepts of coalition analysis to conflict 
analysis by developing an algorithm for determining the preferences of a coalition from 
the preferences of its members as well as an algorithm for ascertaining which DMs are 
likely to form a coalition. Kuhn, Hipel and Fraser’s metric for determining who would 
join a coalition was based on the idea that if DMs had similar preferences, they would be 
Table 2.5. Prisoners’ Dilemma in Tableau Form 
Equilibrium X E E X 
P1stability Nash SEQ Nash U 
P1’s preferences DC CC DD CD 
P1’s UIs  DC  DD 
P2 stability Nash SEQ Nash U 
P2’s preferences CD CC DD DC 
P2’s UIs  CD  DD 




likely to form a coalition throughout the duration of the conflict. Hipel and Meister 
(1993) developed two additional metrics for determining which DMs are likely to join 
together to form a coalition. Although these methodologies are useful for the analysis of 
permanent coalitions that form during conflict, further research was needed in the area of 
temporary coalition formation. Kilgour, Hipel, Fang and Peng (2001) first proposed the 
concepts of coalition moves and Nash coalition stability, while Inohara and Hipel 
(2008a), developed coalition solution concepts for sequential, general metarational and 
symmetric metarational stability along with implementation algorithms. Inohara and 
Hipel, (2008b) developed theoretical relationships among coalition solution concepts as 
well as between noncooperative and cooperative solution concepts. These solution 
concepts, which mirror those shown in Definitions 1 through 10, are as follows: 
Definition 11 (Coalition improvement list): The coalition improvement list of a 
coalition H⊂ N, with states s, t∈S, )(sRH++  is defined as the set {t∈RH(s)| ∀ i∈H, t if s}. 
For a coalition movement to be a coalition improvement it must satisfy the following 
)()()( sRssR HHH ∩=
+++ φ meaning that any coalition improvement is both a more preferred 
state and reachable by the coalition, by the definitions of φ and reachable list given 
earlier.  
The coalition improvement list combines the concepts of a coalition reachable list 
(Definition 5) and a UI list (Definition 3). This new subset of states differs from the UI 
list of a coalition (Definition 6) in that coalition improvement must be more preferred by 
all members of the coalition. 
Definition 12 (Coalition less improved state): Let )(~ sH−φ  represent the set of all 
states that are less preferred to state s or are equally preferred with respect to state s by at 
least one DM in coalition H, that is, {x∈S | ∃ i∈H, (s if x or s ~i x)}. The set )(
~ sH
−φ  thus 
represents all the states that are not more preferred than s by every member of the 
coalition H. 
Definition 13 (Coalition Nash stability for a coalition (CNash)): A state s∈S is 
coalition Nash stable for coalition H∈P(N), denoted by s∈ CNashHS , if and only if 
)(sRH
++ =φ (Kilgour et al., 2001; Hipel and Inohara, 2008). 
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Coalition Nash stability is analogous to Nash stability for a single DM (Definition 
4). The difference, however, lies in the use of the coalition improvement list instead of a 
UI list. Thus, whenever the coalition cannot make an improvement from a state, that state 
is CNash for the coalition. 
Definition 14 (Coalition Nash stability for a DM): For i∈N, state s∈S is 
coalition Nash stable for DM i, if and only if s∈SHCNash for all H∈ (N) such that i∈H. 
If a DM belongs to multiple coalitions and each of these coalitions is CNash 
stable for a given state, that state is CNash for the given DM. 
Definition 15 (Coalition sequentially stable for a coalition (CSEQ)): A state 
s∈S is coalition sequentially stable for coalition H∈P(N), denoted by s∈ CSEQHS , if and 
only if for all x∈ )(sRH++ , )()\( xR HNP++ ∩ )(
~ sH
−φ ≠ φ . 
As with CNash stability, CSEQ stability is also analogous to a previously defined 
solution concept for unilateral movements. As in Definition 10, where SEQ stability is 
defined for a single DM, CSEQ stability exists such that if every coalition improvement 
from a state can be sanctioned by a credible move by a DM or a coalition other than the 
original coalition, it is stable. 
In the following definitions, (H) is a notation that refers to the class that a DM or 
coalition is in, where (N) represents the class of DMs in the whole set N . Additionally, 
subclasses are defined such that for H⊂N, (H) denotes the subclass {K∈ (N) | K⊂H} 
of (N). 
Definition 16 (Coalition sequential stability for a DM) For i∈N, state s∈S is 
coalition sequentially stable for DM i, if and only if s∈SHCSEQ for all H∈ (N) such that 
i∈H.  
If a DM belongs to multiple coalitions and each of these coalitions is CSEQ stable 
for a given state, that state is CSEQ for the given DM. 
Definition 17 (Coalition general metarationality for a coalition (CGMR)): For 
H∈ (N), state s∈S is coalition general metarational for coalition H, denoted by 
s∈SHCGMR, if and only if for all x∈RH++(s), R (N-H)(x)∩ )(
~ sH
−φ ≠ φ . 
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While CSEQ focuses on the credible moves from opposing DMs or coalitions, 
CGMR stability looks at the set of all moves that can be made by opposing DMs or 
coalitions. In this way CSEQ is a subset of CGMR stability in the same way that SEQ is 
a subset of GMR stability (Definition 8). 
Definition 18 (Coalition general metarationality for a DM): For i∈N, state s∈S 
is coalition general metarational for DM i, if and only if s∈SHCGMR for all H∈ (N) such 
that i∈H. 
If a DM belongs to multiple coalitions and each of these coalitions is CGMR 
stable for a given state, that state is CGMR for the given DM. 
Definition 19 (Coalition symmetric metarationality for a coalition (CSMR)) 
For H∈ (N), state s∈S is coalition symmetric metarational for coalition H, denoted by 
s∈SHCSMR, if and only if for all x∈RH++(s), there exists y∈R (N-H)(x)∩ )(
~ sH
−φ  such that 
z∈ )(~ sH−φ  for all z∈RH(y). 
Where CNash stability does not take into account opposing moves and CGMR 
and CSMR look only potential countermoves, CSMR looks one step further to determine 
if there is any escape for the coalition from sanctions by their opposition. Based on the 
SMR solution concept provided in Definition 9, CSMR states that if a state is already 
CGMR stable and the coalition cannot move from the sanctioned to a state that is more 
preferred to the original state, it is stable. 
Definition 20 (Coalition symmetric metarationality for a DM) For i∈N, state 
s∈S is coalition symmetric metarational for DM i, if and only if s∈SHCSMR for all 
H∈ (N) such that i∈H. 
If a DM belongs to multiple coalitions and each of these coalitions is CSMR 
stable for a given state, that state is CSMR for the given DM. 
The relationship between all of the various coalition solution concepts is shown in 
Figure 2.3. As with the noncooperative solution concepts given in Definitions 1 through 
10, CGMR represents the most general solution concept encompassing all others while 
CNash is the most specific, a subset of all others. CSEQ is the subset of CGMR where 
the sanctioning coalition must use a credible move and CSMR represents the subset of 
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CGMR stable states where DMs cannot escape a CGMR sanction. 
 
To illustrate the use of coalition analysis, a three player version of Prisoners’ 
Dilemma is examined to illustrate the implementation of coalition analysis. In this 
conflict, each DM knows that if they all co-operate (C) that there will be a short sentence 
for all three of them. However, if they defect (D) alone, they will not be punished while if 
they defect with another prisoner they will have a reduced sentence. If they co-operate 
while one or both of the other prisoners defect, then they will have an even longer 
sentence. The graph model of this conflict is shown in Fig. 2.4 and is an expansion of the 
conflict model shown in Fig. 2.2. In Fig. 2.4, each state is represented by a three letter 
code made up of ‘C’s and ‘D’s where the first, second and third letters represent the first, 
second and third prisoners, respectively. For example, state CCD represents the state 
where prisoner 1 and prisoner 2 co-operate and prisoner 3 defects. Before examining the 
new conflict illustrated in Figure 2.4, Table 2.6 lists the algorithm used in the application 
of the coalition model. 
 
Table 2.6. Coalition algorithm 
Steps Procedures 
1 Construct the reachable lists of all possible coalitions 
2 Generate the coalition improvement lists of all possible coalitions (to specify coalition Nash stability, jump to Step 6) 
3 
Determine the class reachable lists (needed to specify sanctions for coalition 
general metarationality and coalition symmetric metarationality in Step 5) and 
class improvement lists (required to specify sanctions for coalition sequential 
stability in Step 5) of subclass (N-H) for each coalition H⊂N 
4 Create the coalition improvement list table 
5 
Check the existence of coalition sanctions against each coalition improvement 
from each state (needed for determining coalition general metarationality, 
coalition symmetric metarationality, and coalition sequential stability) 
6 Calculate the stable states for each DM 





Figure 2.3. Interrelationships among Cooperative Stability Concepts 
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Using the solution concepts covered in Definitions 1 through 10, stabilities can be 
determined. Table 2.3 summarizes the results of this analysis. As can be seen, in this 
conflict the only stable state is DDD where all three DMs defect. However, this is not one 
of the most preferred states for any of the DMs. Using coalition analysis, this conflict is 
reanalyzed to illustrate the advantage of coalitions in group decision making. 
 
Table 2.7. Stability of eight states in expanded Prisoners’ Dilemma 
State Solution Concepts P1 Solution Concepts P2 Solution Concepts P3 Eq 
CCC    No 
DCC Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ   No 
CDC  Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ  No 
CCD   Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ No 
CDD  Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ No 
DCD Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ  Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ No 
DDC Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ  No 
DDD Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ Yes 
 
PP1 = {DCC, (DDC, DCD), CCC, DDD, (CCD, CDD, CDC)} 
Prisoner 1’s moves are shown with a solid arrow 
PP2 = {CDC, (DDC, CDD), CCC, DDD, (DCD, CCD, DCC)} 
Prisoner 2’s moves are shown with a dashed arrow 
PP3 = {CCD, (DCD, CDD), CCC, DDD, (DDC, DCC, CDC)} 
Prisoner 3’s moves are shown with a dotted arrow 









Figure 2.4. Integrated graph model of expanded Prisoners’ Dilemma 
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 In Figure 2.5, the integrated model of the expanded Prisoners’ Dilemma is shown 
with a coalition now formed between prisoners 2 and 3. The two prisoners maintain their 
preference vectors, however, they now are able to make coalition movements and 
improvements which are subjected to coalition solution concepts (Hipel and Inohara, 
2008a). 
 
Given this new set of coalition movements a stability analysis was carried out and 
the solution concepts which apply to each of the states are given in Table 2.8. As can be 
seen a significant change has occurred due to the introduction of coalitions to the 
analysis. Most significantly, the state CCC, where all three prisoners co-operate is now 
an equilibrium state, as are states DCD and DDC where either P2 or P3 co-operate and 
the other two defect. DDD remains an equilibrium as it did in the previous analysis, as it 
PP1 = {DCC, (DDC, DCD), CCC, DDD, (CCD, CDD, CDC)} 
Prisoner 1’s moves are shown with a solid arrow 
PP2 = {CDC, (DDC, CDD), CCC, DDD, (DCD, CCD, DCC)} 
Coalition movements are shown with a dashed arrow 
PP3 = {CCD, (DCD, CDD), CCC, DDD, (DDC, DCC, CDC)} 
Coalition movements are shown with a dashed arrow 









Figure 2.5. Integrated graph model of expanded  Prisoners’ Dilemma with coalition 
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is not advantageous for any of the prisoner’s to co-operate if they know that the other 
prisoner’s will defect. 
 
To illustrate how the solution concepts work for the coalition, state CCC is 
examined for coalition stability. At state CCC the coalition between P2 and P3, herein 
referred to as P23, have a set of coalition movements defined as RP23(CCC) = {CDC, 
CCD, CDD}. The coalition improvement list, a subset of RP23(CCC) where all states are 
more preferred for both P2 and P3 is R+P23(CCC) = {CDD}. When coalition P23 moves 
to state CDD, P1 can move to state DDD. As this move by P1 is a credible move such 
that R+P1(CDD) = {DDD} and as CCC 23Pf  DDD, state CCC is CSEQ stable for 
coalition P23 by Definition 15. As RP1(CDD) = {DDD} also, state CCC is also CGMR 
stable for coalition P23 according to Definition 17. In fact, as Ri ⊂  R+i, any state that is 
CSEQ is also CGMR. 
Examining CSMR stability requires looking at the response of P1 to the sanction 
by P23. After P1 sanctioned P23 by moving to state DDD, P23 has the opportunity to 
respond. Examining the set of coalition movements available to P23 at DDD, it can be 
seen that RP23(DDD) = {DCC, DDC, DCD}. As )()(R 23P23 CCCDDD P≈∩φ  for all states in 
the set RP23(DDD), the state is CSMR stable for coalition P23 by Definition 19. 
2.5 Summary 
Conflict analysis is a field of study which examines the potential actions and 
motivations of DMs under conflict in an effort to provide insights into the actions needed 
for successful win-win outcomes to occur, to determine causes of past conflict outcomes 
that were not mutually beneficial for all DMs and to inform policy makers. The Graph 
Model for Conflict Resolution is a game theoretic method which uses strategic 
Table 2.8. Stability of eight states in expanded Prisoners’ Dilemma with coalition 
State Solution Concepts P1 Solution Concepts P2 and P3 coalition Equilibrium 
CCC SEQ, SMR CSEQ, CGMR, CSMR Yes 
DCC Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ CGMR Yes 
CDC  CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ No 
CCD  CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ No 
CDD  CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ No 
DCD Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ Yes 
DDC Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ Yes 
DDD Nash, GMR, SMR, SEQ CNash, CGMR, CSMR, CSEQ Yes 
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information about a conflict including; decision makers, options, preferences and state 
infeasibilities. Based on the tools introduced in this chapter, attitudes will be proposed in 










The analysis of conflict, at a strategic level, as shown through the game theoretic 
methodologies described in Chapter 2, attempts to take into account human behaviour 
under conflict (Fang, Hipel and Kilgour, 1993). An increasing amount of additions to 
GMCR have been proposed which allow DMs to test the sensitivity of stable states to 
variations in human behaviour. Li, Hipel, Kilgour and Fang, (2004) created a framework 
for handling uncertain preferences, while extending those solution concepts mentioned in 
Chapter 2 to this new structure. AL-Mutairi, Hipel, and Kamel (2008), examined the 
structuring of preferences using fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965). Obeidi, et al. (2005) 
examined the impact of emotions on conflict by proposing that subsets of feasible states 
remained hidden in conflicts due to the type of emotions DMs hold. The intent of all 
three of these methods is to account for variation and misunderstanding in the 
determination of each DM’s state stabilities such that a more robust model of human 
behaviour can be created and applied. 
Inohara, et al., (2007), developed attitudes as a method to test the robustness of 
conflict analysis results with the variation in how DMs perceive and act towards 
themselves and others. Within GMCR, preferences, UIs and coalition improvements all 
assume that DMs or coalitions of DMs act in a manner to improve themselves with no 
consideration of their moves upon others (Fraser and Hipel, 1984; Fang, et al, 1993). 
When applying attitudes, however, DMs may make moves and countermoves that align 
with their attitude towards or against the fortunes of one or more other DMs, in spite of 
the DM’s own preferences.  
An advantage of attitudes is the potential it holds for modelling co-operation within 
GMCR, an area that has been developed primarily through coalition analysis. As 
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mentioned in Chapter 2, Hipel and Meister (1993), examined the formation of permanent 
coalitions while Kilgour, et al. (2001) and Hipel and Inohara (2008a), examined the 
formation of temporary coalitions and their associated solution concepts. Although 
GMCR is concerned with the study of non-cooperative conflicts, the application of 
attitudes can examine cooperative style negotiations as well as more overtly aggressive 
conflicts (Inohara, et al., 2007; Walker, et al., 2008). 
3.2 Definitions of Attitudes 
In order to utilize the concept of attitudes with the graph model, it is necessary to 
provide precise mathematical definitions of attitudes and the associated preference 
structures and movements it contains. Definitions 21 through 28 provide the structure of 
attitudes within the graph model while Definitions 29 through 32 provide solution 
concepts for calculating state stabilities under attitudes. 
Definition 21 (Attitudes): For DMs i, j∈N, let Ei = {+, 0,  – }N represent the set of 
attitudes of DM i.  An element ei ∈  Ei is called the attitudes of DM i for which ei = (eij) is 
the list of attitudes of DM i towards DM j for each j∈N where eij ∈  {+, 0,  –}.  The eij is 
referred to as the attitude of DM i to DM j where the values eij = +, eij = 0 and eij =  –  
indicates that DM i has a positive, neutral and negative attitude towards DM j, 
respectively. 
Consider a conflict, such as prisoner’s dilemma analyzed in Chapter 2, which 
consists of two DMs called DM i and DM j.  Table 3.1 displays how the attitudes within 
this or any other conflict can be stored in a matrix such that rows i and j contain the list of 
attitudes for DMs i and j, respectively, where each cell entry can take on a value of +, 0 
or –.  The underlying attitudes assumed in a regular analysis, where a given DM is 




A social network, (N, (ei) Ni∈ ), is the pair N, the set of DMs and (ei) Ni∈  the set of 
attitudes of all DMs within the set N. Applying this pair to the framework of GMCR 
described in Chapter 2 entails defining a whole new set of moves and preferences. The 
following definitions detail these moves and preferences while providing solution 
concepts based upon those developed by Nash (1950, 1951), Howard (1971) and Fang, et 
al. (1993). 
Definition 22 (Devoting preference (DP)): The devoting preference of DM i∈N 
with respect to DM j∈N is jf , denoted by DPij, such that for s, t∈S, s DPij t if and only 
if s jf t. 
A devoting preference is such that if DM i has a devoting preference for state s 
with respect to state t for DM j, then DM j must prefer state s to state t. A similar 
definition can be written for aggressive preference. 
Definition 23 (Aggressive preference (AP)): The aggressive preference of DM 
i∈N with respect to DM j∈N is NE( jf ), denoted by APij, where NE( jf ) is defined as 
follows: for s, t∈S, s NE( jf ) t if and only if s jf t is not true. That is, for s, t∈S, s APij t if 
and only if s NE( jf ) t (if and only if t jf s under completeness of jf ). 
In contrast to devoting preferences, aggressive preferences are such that if DM i 
has an aggressive preference for state s with respect to state t for DM j, then DM j must 
prefer state t to state s. Using these concepts, as well as an indifference preference where 
the DM does not care which state is selected, represented by I, relational preference can 
be determined. 
Table 3.1. Tabular Representation of Attitudes 
DM i j 
i eii eij 
j eji ejj 
Table 3.2. Attitudes in a Regular Analysis 
DM i j 
i + 0 
j 0 + 
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Definition 24 (Relational preference): The relational preference RP(e)ij of DM 




















where Iij denotes that DM i is indifferent with respect to j’s preference and, hence, s Iij x 
means that DM i’s preferences between state s and x is not influenced by DM j’s 
preference. 
Within the definition of relational preferences, different types of preferences are 
matched with their corresponding attitudes.  Thus if DM i has a positive attitude about 
DM j, DM i will have a devoting preference with respect to DM j.  If DM i has a negative 
attitude towards DM j, DM i will have an aggressive preference with respect to DM j.  
Thus, a DM behaves according to his or her attitudes and relational preferences reflect 
this. 
Definition 25 (Total relational preference(TRP)): The total relational preference 
of DM i∈N at e is defined as the ordering TRP(e)i such that for s, t∈S, s TRP(e)i t if and 
only if s RP(e)ij t for all j∈N. 
For a state to satisfy a total relational preference for DM i in comparison to a given 
state, s, the state must be relationally preferred according to the attitudes of DM i towards 
all of the DMs in the conflict.  For example, if a state t is a total relational preference for 
DM i to state s with respect to himself and DM j, and there are two DMs in the conflict, 
then state s is a total relational preference by DM i relative to state t. 
In order for a state to be a totally relational preferred state for a DM i from a state s, 
the state must be a relational preference at s according to the attitudes of the DM i. In 
Figure 3.1, DM i has relational preferences at state s according to her attitudes towards 
DMs j and k. However, only states t and v are totally relationally preferred as they belong 
to both the set RPij(s) and RPik(s). 
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Definition 26 (Total relational reply (TRR)): The total relational reply list of DM 
i∈N at e for state s∈S is defined as the set {t∈Ri(s)U {s} | t TRP(e)i s}⊂  Ri(s)U {s}, 
denoted by TRR(e)i(s). 
A TRR for a given DM at some state can be seen as the relational equivalent of a 
UI from that same state. Continuing from Fig 3.1, total relational replies are determined 
from the intersection of the reachable list and total relational preferences as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Here, DM i has total relational preferences for states t and v and has the 
reachable list Ri(s) = {m, n, o, v}. Thus the total relational reply set for DM i at state s is 
TRRi(s) = {v}. 
 
















Definition 27 (Total relational reply list of a coalition): The total relational reply 
list of coalition H ⊂  N  at e for state s∈ S is defined inductively as the set TRR(e)H(s) 
that satisfies the next two conditions: (i) if i∈H and t∈TRR(e)i(s), then t∈TRR(e)H(s), 
and (ii) if i∈H and t∈TRR(e)H(s) and u∈TRR(e)i(t), then u∈TRR(e)H(s). 
Definition 28 (Relational less preferred or equally preferred states):  The 
symbol )()(~ seR i−φ  is an analogue of )(~ si−φ given in Chapter 2.  Hence, )()(
~ seR i
−φ  is the set 
of all states which are not relationally preferred to s by DM i (under attitude e).  Note that 
NE(x TRP(e)i s) means that “x TRP(e)i s” is not true. 
Employing the foregoing definitions, relational solution concepts can now be 
defined as an extension of rational solution concepts when attitudes are taken into 
account. 
Definition 29 (Relational Nash stability (RNash)): For i∈N, state s∈S is 
relational Nash stable at e for DM i, denoted by s∈ )(eRNashiS , if and only if TRR(e)i (s) = 
{s}. 
Definition 30 (Relational general metarationality (RGMR)): For i∈N, state s∈S 
is relational general metarational at e for DM i, denoted by s∈ )(eRGMRiS , if and only if for 
all x∈TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, )(}{\ xR iN ∩ )()(
~ seR i
−φ ≠ φ . 
Relational general metarationality is best described as a situation in which a DM 
makes a unilateral move and opposing DMs sanction that move with moves of their own.  
In RGMR, these sanctioning moves do not have to be total relational replies by the other 
DMs – they only have to be possible moves by the sanctioning DMs. 
Definition 31 (Relational symmetric metarationality (RSMR)): For i∈N, state 
s∈S is relational symmetric metarational at e for DM i, denoted by s∈ )(eRSMRiS , if and only 
if for all x∈TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, there exists y∈ )(}{\ xR iN ∩ )()(
~ seR i
−φ  such that z∈ )()(~ seR i−φ  
for all z∈Ri(y). 
As in the case of RGMR, the sanctioning moves need only be possible moves by 
the other DMs and do not have to be either credible or relational. 
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Definition 32 (Relational sequential stability (RSEQ)): For i∈N, state s∈S is 
relational sequential stable at e for DM i, denoted by s∈ )(eRSEQiS , if and only if for all 
x∈TRR(e)i(s) \ {s}, TRR(e) }{\ iN (x)∩ )()(
~ seR i
−φ ≠ φ . 
Sequential stability occurs when one DM makes a move according to his or her 
total relational reply list and opposing DMs can sanction the move by moving to a state 
in their total relational reply lists. 
One can also define what are termed “strict” versions of Definitions 22 to 32.  
More specifically, in Definition 22 if  is replaced by if to define strictly devoting 
preference, and in Definition 23 NE ( if ) is replaced by NE ( if ), to define strictly 
aggressive preference followed by appropriate definitions and name changes made in the 
remaining definitions (Inohara, et al., 2007). 
3.3 Attitudes and Prisoner’s Dilemma 
As described in Chapter 2, prisoner’s dilemma is a common 2x2 conflict which 
examines how two prisoners who have worked together, act under conflict. In the 
previous analysis in Chapter 2, it was assumed that both P1 and P2 had positive attitudes 
towards themselves and indifferent attitudes towards each other. If different attitudes are 
applied to this conflict changes to state stability and equilibria results occur. In Table 3.3, 
two social networks are given. These social networks will be used to illustrate the impact 
of attitudes upon the prisoner’s dilemma conflict. 
 
In Social Network 1 (SN1), it can be seen that both P1 and P2 have a negative 
attitude towards each other and indifferent attitudes towards themselves, thus SN1 will be 
used to examine prisoner’s dilemma from the perspective of highly aggressive prisoners. 
Table 3.3. Social Networks for analysis of Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Social Network 1 
DM P1 P2 
P1 0  –   
P2 – 0 
Social Network 2 
DM P1 P2 
P1 + + 
P2 + 0 
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In Social Network 2 (SN2), it can be seen that both P1 and P2 have positive attitudes 
towards themselves and each other. SN2 can thus be seen as a highly devoting version of 
prisoner’s dilemma. As both SN1 and SN2 represent situations where DMs have the 
same attitudes, they can be referred to as symmetric social networks. These social 
networks will be used to illustrate the impact of attitudes upon the prisoner’s dilemma 
conflict.  
Given the set of attitudes for SN1 and SN2, it is possible to use the concept of 
relational preferences to determine TRPs and TRR lists. Table 3.4 displays the type of 
preferences between states that are held by both P1 and P2 in SN1 and SN2. These 
preference types follow, of course, from the definition of total relational preferences 
(TRP) found in Definition 25. 
 
Using the preference information known for P1 and P2 in both SNs it is possible to 
determine the TRR lists for each DM at each state. In Table 3.5, each of P1’s and P2’s 
reachable lists, R(s), are given from each state s. Using preference information, where 
states that are more preferred for DM i at some state s are denoted as Pi(s), total relational 
preferences are determined for both P1 and P2 and using this information and the 
reachable lists already determined, total relational replies are completed.  
Table 3.4. Applied Preferences in SN1 and SN2 
Social Network 1 
DM P1 P2 
P1 IP1-P1 APP1-P2 
P2 APP2-P1 IP2-P2 
Social Network 2 
DM P1 P2 
P1 IPP1-P1 DPP1-P2 




Taking the total relational replies for both social networks a simple analysis can be 
done in tableau form to determine the stability results. If the conflicts are written in 
tableau form, as previously done in the regular analysis in Table 3.5, a better vision of the 
new social networks and their stabilities can be seen. Table 3.6 displays the tableau form 
of both social networks with calculated relational stability results using only RNash and 
RSEQ stabilities. 
Table 3.5. Determining TRRs in SN1 and SN2 
State  (s) DC CC DD CD 
PP1(s) - DC DC, CC 
DC, CC, 
DD 
RP1(s) CC DC CD DD 
PP2(s) 
CD, CC, 
DD CD CD, CC - 
RP2(s) DD CD DC CC 










RPP1-P2(s) - DD, DC DC 
DC, CC, 
DD 
TRPP1(s) - DD, DC DC 
DC, CC, 
DD 
TRRP1(s) - DC - DD 
RPP2-P1(s) 
CD, CC, 












DD CD, DD CD - 
TRRP2(s) DD CD - - 
Social Network 2 





DD CD CD, CC - 
TRPP1(s) - - CC - 
TRRP1(s) - - - - 





DD CD CD, CC - 
TRPP2(s) - - CC - 




In graph form, as shown in Figure 3.3 it is possible to see the contrast between the 
potential unilateral improvements available to each of the DMs under regular analysis 
and how these change with the application of attitudes. As can be seen in both the regular 
analysis and Social Network 1, P1 and P2 have the same unilateral improvements or total 
relational replies. This implies that when P1 and P2 hold negative attitudes towards each 
other it is the same as their positive attitudes towards themselves and implies that the 
preferences of both DMs are such that self-improvement means disimprovements for 
their adversary. In fact, the only situation in prisoner’s dilemma where it can be observed 
that there are differences in the movements that the DMs will make is when they start 
acting with attitudes of cooperation towards each other.  
Table 3.6. Prisoners’ dilemma with attitudes in tableau form 
Social Network 1 
Equilibrium X E E X 
P1stability RNash RSEQ RNash U 
P1’s preferences DC CC DD CD 
P1’s UIs  DC  DD 
P2 stability RNash RSEQ RNash U 
P2’s preferences CD CC DD DC 
P2’s UIs  CD  DD 
Social Network 2
Equilibrium X E E X 
P1stability U RNash RSEQ RNash 
P1’s preferences DC CC DD CD 
P1’s TRRs CC  CD  
P2 stability U RNash RSEQ RNash 
P2’s preferences CD CC DD DC 
P2’s TRRs CC  DC  




Looking at the analysis of Social Network 2 more closely it is possible to explain 
how relational sanctioning works. In Table 3.6 both P1 and P2 have total relational 
replies in Social Network 2 that are the opposite of those in Social Network 1 and thus 
the results are significantly different. Examining P1’s total relational replies it can be 
seen that as there exists no relationally sound movements from CC and CD, both states 
are RNash stable according to Definition 29. From state DC, P1 has a total relational 
reply to CC, according to its relational preferences as determined in Table 3.5.  As P2 has 
no total relational replies from state CC and cannot thus respond, state DC is unstable 
according to Definition 29, RSEQ stability. If RGMR stability is applied, however, P2 
would have a move from state CC to CD which is relationally preferred to state DC by 
P1 and thus state DC is not RGMR by Definition 30 for P1. At state DD, P1 has a total 
relational reply to state CD where P2 has a total relational reply to state CC. As CC is 
relationally preferred by P1 to state DD, state DD is unstable for P1. In fact, the same can 
be seen in an analysis of the stability of state DD with respect to P2. 
3.4 Summary 
By applying attitudes to the analysis of a conflict, it is possible to determine the 
potential impacts on conflict or negotiation resolution that arise due to DM attitudes. The 
















P2 – Regular Analysis P2 – Social Network 1 P2 – Social Network 2
Figure 3.3. Unilateral improvements and total relational replies in Prisoners’ Dilemma  
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new potential movements that were not credible in the regular analysis. In Chapter 5, 
attitudes will be applied, along with coalition analysis, to brownfield applications in order 









In order to better understand the manner in which brownfield conflicts can be 
modelled, it was necessary to review the established literature in the area of brownfield 
impacts, indicators and the currently used decision support systems. Thus, this review of 
literature covers the area of brownfield redevelopment and examines information 
pertinent to the application of conflict analysis in this sector.  This includes the social, 
economic and environmental aspects of such redevelopment as well as the attitudes, 
biases and preferences of decision makers in this field.  Literature regarding interactions 
between communities and other stakeholders involved in brownfield redevelopment who 
may not have direct decision power is also reviewed.  The main goals of this literature 
review are to identify what areas of research need to be strengthened to improve 
brownfield redevelopment and management practices, to determine the properties typical 
of brownfield conflicts that would aid the implementation of decision support tools and 
decision support systems (DSSs) and to illustrate the motivations held by decision 
makers (DMs) for these redevelopment projects. 
The majority of literature covering brownfield redevelopment quotes the USEPA’s 
definition of brownfields as “abandoned, idled or under-utilised industrial and 
commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or 
perceived contamination” (USEPA, 1997).  Notably, this definition is open-ended and 
suggests that a site need only be perceived as contaminated in order to be considered a 
brownfield.  McCarthy notes that contamination can “…be merely suspected as well as 
documented” (McCarthy, 2002) in order for a property to be considered a brownfield.  
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4.2 Social, Economic and Ecological Impacts 
Brownfield redevelopment projects impact three separate but interacting sectors: 
social, economic and environmental (Greenberg and Lewis, 2000; De Sousa, 2003; 
McCarthy, 2002).  Thus, there is an interest in holistic techniques to deal with these 
interacting impacts.   
 Economic impacts are extremely important to the redevelopment of brownfields 
in North America.  Studies have shown that the presence of brownfields within a 
neighbourhood can often lower property values of adjacent properties (Greenberg et al, 
2000a).  Also, the removal of the companies that once used the land results in a lower tax 
base for the whole community (Bacot and O’Dell, 2006; Knee, et al., 2001).  This 
reduction of income for the community as a whole can often be seen in a decrease in 
services.  This decrease in services can include reductions in police and fire support, road 
maintenance and garbage collection services (Greenberg and Lewis, 2000).  Often this 
reduction in services results in further industries leaving the affected area.  De Sousa 
(2003) and Gertler (1995) note that many of the brownfields in the City of Toronto are a 
result of the exodus of industry in the 1970s from the blighted downtown core. 
The undertaking of the redevelopment projects themselves are often very much 
affected by economic factors.  Financial risk due to the unknown cost of remediating a 
brownfield site is an important consideration for private redevelopment investors.  De 
Sousa (2000) found that liability concerns, high remediation costs, the slow regulatory 
review process and complex municipal land-use policies were the most pressing 
obstacles to private redevelopment of brownfields.  He found also that uncertainty related 
to the site-specific risk assessment, a lack of government incentives, obtaining financing, 
lack of knowledge and negative attitude on the part of the public and stakeholders were 
pressing financial concerns for the developers.  Although there are numerous economic 
risks taken on by the developer, there are many economic benefits to be obtained by 
communities whose brownfield are redeveloped. These benefits include an increased 
utilization of the municipal tax base, an increase in property value and the attraction of 
outside investment (De Sousa, 2000; Greenberg et al, 1998; McCarthy, 2002).   
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In order to use this information to improve redevelopment projects, indicators have 
been developed.  Bacot and O’Dell (2006) developed a set of indicators based on a 
selection of the social, economic and environmental impacts listed.  The economic 
indicators they hypothesize for use in brownfield redevelopment are property value, 
parcel size, the amount of tax relief, the amount of private and public investment, market 
condition, end use of site, and return on investment and cleanup costs.  Property value 
and market conditions were found by Bacot and O’Dell to be positively influenced by 
brownfield redevelopment.  This agrees with previous research by Greenberg et al (1998, 
2000), De Sousa (2000, 2003) and McCarthy (2002).  Parcel size was noted as not having 
as significant an impact on the areas studies by Bacot and O’Dell.  However, previous 
research by Meyer and Lyons (2000) found that larger parcels were more preferable to 
developers as they allow investors to “… more easily capitalize their investment” (Bacot 
and O’Dell, 2006).   
 Concerns regarding cleanup costs and investment costs were found to be 
unwarranted.  Bacot and O’Dell determined that remediation costs averaged less than 
0.5% of the total investment and as high as only 6% of the total investment.  De Sousa 
(2000) found that remediation was approximately 1.9% of total investments for his 
chosen case studies although 4.3% of investors listed remediation costs as a serious 
economic obstacle.  Tax incentives were found to be of unknown affect on the successful 
development of brownfields.  Bacot and O’Dell suggest that although the case studies 
within the scope of their article are successful, a proper economic analysis needs to be 
done to full understand the impact of tax relief. 
The environmental aspect of brownfield contamination is the most obvious and has 
been the root of most remediation and redevelopment work for a long time.  Subsurface 
contamination, a common issue on most brownfield sites, can infiltrate into groundwater 
which in turn affects the ecology throughout the ecosystem (Murray and Rogers, 1999).  
The presence of these contaminants in the subsurface and groundwater is also a human 
health hazard.  The multitude of pathways for human infection: dermal, oral and 
inhalation are all potentially vulnerable to carcinogens and other negative impacts from 
contaminants in the soil or water.  Traditionally, environmental management has focused 
on the resolution of these issues as the keys to successful projects (Lawrence, 2000).
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 Environmental indicators related to impacts on ecological receptors and human 
health are important to the redevelopment of brownfields.  Environmental risk assessors 
use hazard quotient calculations to determine whether wildlife is being exposed to undue 
harm through contamination (Rodricks, 2004; USEPA, 2006).   The hazard quotient 
(HQ) is referred is the ratio of the dose or estimated concentration of contaminant divided 
by some benchmark limit for the specific contaminant.  Mathematically, this is written as 
follows:   
“(1) HQ = Dose / Screening Benchmark 
(2) HQ = EEC / Screening Benchmark 
Dose = an estimated amount of how much contaminant is taken in by a plant or 
animal, in terms of the body weight of the plant or animal (e.g., mg contaminant/kg 
body weight per day);   
EEC = estimated (maximum) environmental contaminant concentration at the site; 
how much contaminant is in the soil, sediment, or water (e.g., mg contaminant/kg 
soil)   
Screening benchmark = generally a No-Adverse Effects Level concentration; if the 
contamination concentration is below this level, the contaminant is not likely to cause 
adverse effects” (USEPA, 2006). 
When the HQ is greater than 1, the contaminant is likely to cause adverse affects on 
the ecology.  When the HQ is equal to 1 the contaminant alone is thought not to cause 
adverse affects and if it is less than 1 harmful effect are thought to be unlikely (USEPA, 
2006).  The calculation of the HQ is much more complicated than a simple division 
problem.  Although benchmark concentrations are provided by the USEPA, it is difficult 
to determine a dose.  From concentrations in the soil uptake factors, linear regressive 
equations are often used to determine a daily uptake by the animal or plant.  Further 
information must be taken into account including the range of the animal, body weight, 
diet composition, % of soil in diet and exposure route.  Using all of this information a 
dosage in the units (mg contaminant/(kg bodyweight – day)) can be calculated and 
compared to the no-adverse affect levels.  This no-adverse affect levels is defined as 
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“[t]he highest level of a chemical stressor in a toxicity test that did not cause harmful 
effect in a plant or animal” (USEPA, 2006). 
 Indicators of hazards to human health are broken up into two main categories: 
cancer and non-cancer risk (Rodricks, 2004a).  Non-carcinogenic effects are measured 
using the hazard quotient similar to that used for wildlife while carcinogenic effects are 
measured using the incremental lifetime cancer risk (ILCR).  The difference in the 
calculation of the hazard quotient for human receptors is that in the context of a site-
specific risk analysis (SSRA), the exposure may be considered to be for only a few hours 
a day depending on the site use and the nature of the contamination.  The doses for 
dermal, inhalation and ingestion are all calculated using different pathway dependent 
formulae.  This dosage is then compared to a reference dose (RfD) to calculate the HQ. 
 (3) HQ = Dose / RfD 
The HQ is interpreted in exactly the same manner as it is for ecological impacts.  
The RfD can be ascertained from the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) which is 
used by the large majority of risk assessors (USEPA, 2006a). 
In order to determine the additional risk to humans of cancer from exposure to 
contamination, the Incremented Lifetime Cancer Risk (ILCR) is used. In Canada the 
ILCR is 1 x 10-6 which represents an increased risk of 1 in 1 million of developing cancer 
from exposure to a carcinogen. As with HQ calculations, a dosage is calculated for all 






YWDIngRConcADD life  
This dose calculation is referred to as the average daily dose over a lifetime 
<ADD>life which is measured in (mg contaminant/(kg body weight*day)).  Specifically, 
the dose referred to is through ingestion of drinking water and would be used to 
determine uptake through drinking water.  The parameters are defined as: 
<ADD>life = average daily dose, averaged over a lifetime, mg/(kg•d) 
Conc = concentration in drinking water (mg/l) 
IngR = ingestion rate (l/d) 
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BW = body weight (kg) 
D = number of days of exposure per week 
W = number of weeks of exposure per year 
Y = number of years of exposure in lifetime of 70 yr (Rodricks, 2004; Burmaster 
and Wilson, 1996)   
 In the case of brownfield redevelopment soil ingestion is an important potential 
source of exposure.  Using contaminant concentrations in the soil an ingestion dosage is 
calculated, similar to that shown in (4) for drinking water ingestion.  Uptake rates of soil 
for resident children, resident adults and workers are estimated to be 200, 100 and 50-480 
mg/day respectively.  These estimates are then used to calculate the dosage. 
Dermal uptakes of contaminants in soil are estimated using an estimate of either 
soil-to-skin adhesion or approximate uptakes percentages.  Values of adherence factors 
have been previously assumed to be in the range of 1.45 mg/cm2 to 2.77 mg/cm2  
(USEPA, 2006a). However, as noted on the USEPA website “[n]ew data in this area 
indicates that this range should be changed to 0.2 mg/cm2 to 1.0 mg/cm2” (USEPA, 
2006a).  This change in absorption factors illustrates the uncertainty involved in 
determining accurate contaminant doses. 
Inhalation rates for adults and children are defined in order to determine 
approximate inhalation exposure.  For “adults [the rate] is 20 m3/day” while the rate used 
for “[c]hildren should be…15 m3/day” (USEPA, 2006).  In order to determine the intake, 
however, an airborne concentration must be calculated.  This is often accomplished using 
Henry’s law as well as information regarding soil porosity and air circulation (Rodricks, 
2004a). 
After the dose has been calculated for ingestion, dermal and inhalation the sum of 
the exposure are multiplied by the cancer slope factor (CSF) to determine the ILCR.  
CSFs are available from the USEPA website for radionuclides and PCBs while all of the 
CSFs can found on the IRIS system.  CSFs are often developed through bioassay on other 
mammal species or case studies.  The combination of ILCR and HQ provide a 
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characterization of the human health risk associated with the contamination of soil and 
water in brownfields. 
While the ILCR and HQ require some complex calculations, they are not exact 
representations of the contamination of the system.  Risk assessors must make 
assumptions with varying amounts of uncertainty in order to characterize the risk to the 
system.  Sources of uncertainty include natural variability in ecological characteristics 
and responses and uncertainties in the test system and extrapolations (USEPA, 1992).  
Thus, an uncertainty analysis is an important element of environmental risk assessments. 
The environmental and economic impacts have a significant affect on the social 
situation within the community affected by the brownfield.  Often these sites are in 
neighbourhoods with higher crime while vacated sites become a haven for drug sales and 
other illicit activities (Greenberg et al, 1998; De Sousa, 2000).  As there is a decrease in 
the amount of police and fire service in these areas, it becomes easier for crime to 
prosper.  The blight itself and the contamination or perceived contamination keeps others 
from moving to the community and thus further impacts the social structure of the 
community.  The positive social impacts include an increase in community services, 
increased quality of life, increased community health and urban renewal (De Sousa, 
2000; Greenberg et al, 1998; McCarthy, 2002; Bacot and O’Dell, 2006). 
 Greenberg and Lewis (2000) studied brownfield redevelopment in an ethnically 
diverse urban setting.  They found that community participation rates in brownfield 
redevelopment were related to participation in previous community projects.  This 
relationship corresponds to McCarthy’s 2002 findings that community goals are an 
indicator of the responses communities will have been to brownfield redevelopment 
projects.  Greenberg and Lewis also found that ethnicity and the amount of time a person 
had been a resident did not have an impact on their interest on brownfield redevelopment. 
 One movement that is finding greater prominence in brownfields literature is the 
redevelopment of brownfields as green space.  De Sousa (2003) and Grimski and Ferber 
(2001), note that the focus of European brownfield redevelopment activities has been on 
the transformation of blighted lands into park lands.  This, De Sousa notes, is in stark 
contrast to North American brownfield projects which have focused primarily on 
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commercial and industrial developments.  De Souse notes that there are four separate 
types of parks that all play an important part in the urban landscape as defined by the 
City of Toronto.  These types of parks are: parkettes, local park, district/city parks and 
natural heritage areas.  Each of these parks plays an important role in the social and 
environmental structure of the city.  Parkettes, local parks and city parks offer 
recreational facilities to neighbourhoods, communities and the city, respectively.  Natural 
heritage parks offer environmental refuge within the city that is both aesthetically and 
ecologically important.   
 Lerner and Poole (1999) explain that there are many economic benefits to be 
taken from the creation of open space within cities.  They cite many case studies of 
formerly industrialized American cities that, by utilizing their vacant land for parks were 
able to promote significant economic gains for the community.  Chattanooga, Tennessee 
is examined for its implementation of a 75-mile wide green space between 1988 and 
1996.  Over this period, Lerner and Poole tell us, total assessed property value increased 
by an estimated 127.5%.  The city tax revenue also expanded, increasing by 99% over the 
8 year period.  An interview by the researchers with city chairman David Crockett 
reveals the misperceptions that can interfere with the development of parks.  Crockett 
notes that while he was first working to implement park systems in Chattanooga, “People 
asked why we should spend money on walking paths and parks when we have schools 
that need money and roads to fix and we need to create more jobs. But now we have 
moved beyond thinking of those as tradeoffs. It is understood that we invest in all of 
those things. There is consensus that we will continue to add more parks, open space, and 
walking areas to the city" (Lerner and Poole, 1999).  The National Parks Service (NPS) 
noted in 1983 that the creation of park land results in a myriad improvements including: 
“job creation, business stimulation, increased consumer spending, property value 
increases, attraction of relocating/new firms, reduced impact of natural disasters, health 
care savings, infrastructure savings, public service savings” (Greenberg and Lewis, 
2000). 
 Among the many benefits of park land development are environmental and social 
improvements.  Environmentally, the development of parklands in ecologically 
significant areas can decrease the need for water filtration processes.  Improvements to 
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pollution control and noise abatement as well as improved air quality are related to the 
introduction of open space into the urban setting (NPS, 1983).  The creation of parkland 
gives planners and engineers a way to fight urban sprawl, flooding and erosion while 
preserving the natural ecology (Greenberg et al, 2000).  New York City, for example, has 
developed parks on some of its upstate watershed land in order to reduce the need for 
water filtration further down stream.  This development, Lerner and Poole explain, is in 
response to the deleterious impacts of the development of watershed land.  The high cost 
of maintaining drinkable water; as well as the serious affects on the ecology is important 
reasons for protecting these areas and developing open space or park land on these 
sensitive sites. Similarly, the Trust for Public Land and the Open Space Institute created 
natural heritage parkland in the state of New Jersey which helped preserve habitats for a 
number of animals and preserve 150,000 acres of valuable forests.  This project 
additionally protected seven miles of the Appalachian Trail, an important recreational 
area (Lerner and Poole, 1999). 
 In Greenberg and Lewis’ study of brownfield redevelopment in an urban setting 
of mixed ethnicity (2000), he found that the majority of residents preferred the 
development of a park over all other potential development options.  In, fact the 
researchers found that 90% of respondents to their survey preferred that brownfield land 
be redeveloped to hold a park.  Lafortezza, et. al (2004) explain that when a Brownfield 
to parkland transition is done properly the reclaimed land can “…increase the survival of 
wildlife population and the establishment of recreational activities” (Lafortezza, et. al, 
2004).  De Sousa (2000) also explains that the redevelopment of brownfields into 
parklands can help destigmatise neighborhoods that have long been blighted.  These 
benefits can lead to improved quality of life for the inhabitants of the community through 
recreational activities, increased interaction and increased social and cultural activities 
(Gold, 1973).  This in turn leads to “increased exercise and recreation, delayed aging 
process, mental health improvement, reduction of stress, improved sleep, aggression 
control, increased opportunity for motor skill development in children [and opportunity 
for] weight control” (Greenberg et al, 2000).  Additional social benefits come through the 
improvement of the community.  Parks notably reduce crime, increase community pride 
and stabilize neighborhoods. 
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The indicators of brownfield redevelopment cover the spectrum of environmental, 
social and economic areas.  Social indicators are often qualitative and thus difficult to 
measure.  Greenberg et al (1998, 2000), De Sousa (2003) and Bacot and O’Dell (2006) 
all utilize case studies to gather an understanding of the impact of social indicators on the 
success of  brownfield redevelopment.  Unless a large number of case studies are carried 
out the results may be enough to “make an important contribution to the knowledge” but 
not to generalize the demographics and their impacts upon brownfield redevelopment 
(Dair and Williams, 2005, 1347).  Thomas (2003) acknowledges that the wide array of 
stakeholders with varying views have a significant impact on the implementation of 
brownfield projects.  Thus accurate social information transferred to the appropriate 
decision makers is necessary so as to ensure that projects have positive social outcomes 
(Thomas, 2003). 
Economic indicators are often taken from a wide range of sources including federal 
and local government offices as well as individual investors (Bacot and O’Dell, 2006).  
They also note that because the data comes from such a wide array of sources it is 
difficult to create useful performance vectors that are practical and relevant.  Bacot and 
O’Dell also point out that experience on the part of investors and local government, 
though perhaps difficult to measure, is a key impact upon the economic success of a 
brownfield redevelopment project.  Additional to experience, risk and uncertainty are 
extremely important aspects of the projects that affect the economic success of 
brownfields projects.  Meyer and Lyons (2000) note that the strict liability put upon land 
owners from the 1980 Superfund act in the United States has increased the importance of 
economic uncertainty and risk in redevelopment projects.  Here in Canada, Site Specific 
Risk Assessments are carried out on behalf of land owners to reduce the amount of risk 
and liability to the landowner (MOE).  However, the uncertainty when acquiring the land 
as to the extent of remediation and the high cost of insurance remain important barriers to 
brownfield redevelopment here in Canada (De Sousa, 2000). 
The environmental indicators affecting both the human health and wildlife 
receptors are based upon uncertainty and risk.  Although risk can be quantified, as shown 
in the calculation of Incremental Lifetime Cancer Risk (ILCR) or through the use of 
Hazard Quotients (HQ) or Hazard Indices (HI), there still remains uncertainty as to the 
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affect of brownfields on the ecology and public health.  Greenberg and Hollander (2006) 
worry that public health benefits are being “inferred rather than being estimated” 
(Greenberg and Hollander, 2006) in some cases.  Their concern is not that appropriate 
indicators don’t exist in the United States to tackle environmental brownfield concerns, 
but rather they are concerned as to whether analysts will apply this data. 
Health Canada notes that “any level of exposure (other than zero) is associated with 
some hypothetical cancer risk” (Health Canada, 2005).  The development of the 1-in-106 
risk of cancer due to some contamination was “purely arbitrary” but has come to 
represent what Health Canada and the Ministry of the Environment see is an essentially 
negligible amount of carcinogen.  The EPA notes that although threshold indicators are 
the most important in the environmental remediation of a Brownfield.  However, they 
note that cost-effectiveness, long and short-term effectiveness and the reduction in 
volume and toxicity are also important factors (USEPA, 2006b).  Burmaster and Wilson 
(1996), argue that the use of point values instead of probabilistic ranges to describe the 
potential environmental risk is short cited.  Thus, although there are definite methods that 
are currently in place to measure the environmental impacts of redevelopment, there is 
some question as to their enforcement and their usefulness. 
In summary, Table 4.1 lays out the various indicators used in assessment of 
brownfields and renovated brownfield projects mentioned previously. While not a 
comprehensive list of indicators they provide a wealth of information regarding the 
success of a brownfield project or the impact of an undeveloped brownfield. 
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The large number of social, economic and environmental indicators that have been 
developed figure into all brownfield redevelopment projects.  However, the uncertainty 
of the data and the breadth of sources and methods needed to obtain said data remain as 
obstacles to Brownfield redevelopment. 
Dair and Williams (2006), De Sousa (2003; 2000) and Greenberg et al (1998; 
2000) all conclude that the key decision makers are private and public developers, federal 
or provincial government agencies and community groups.  All of these decision makers 
have interest in the environmental, social and economic impacts of Brownfield 
redevelopment.  Including this wide range of decision makers in a holistic approach is 
important to the success of Brownfield redevelopment (Lawrence, 2000; McCarthy, 
2002).  The conflict, uncertainty and risk in all three important sectors affect all of these 
decision makers. 
4.2.1 Global Trends in Brownfield  
While brownfields are a phenomenon that is global, the vast majority of literature 
available deals with the redevelopment of such properties within Canada and the United 
States of America (USA). However, due to the movement of industry from developed 
nations to developing nations, all of Europe as well as North and South America are 
faced with an increasing number of brownfields. 
 
Table 4.1. Examples of indicators of brownfield presence and redevelopment 
Type of Indicator Examples 
Social • Crime rates 
• Community pride 
• Availability of municipal services 
• Community migration rates 
Economic • Municipal tax income 
• Reduction in municipal expenditures 
• Real estate prices 
• Availability of housing 
Environmental/Health • Wildlife Exposure Levels 
• Hazard Quotient 
• Incremental Lifetime Cancer Risk 
• Presence of greenfields 
• Biodiversity 
• Pollution levels 
• Noise levels 
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The USEPA’s information about tolerable concentrations of contaminants as well 
as the integrated risk information system (IRIS) is not just used in the USA but in Canada 
and abroad as the USEPA has set the standard in brownfield information systems 
(USEPA, 2006; Rodricks, 2004). 
4.3 Decision Support Tools for Brownfield Applications 
Conflict models and decision support systems are an increasingly important aspect 
of environmental management (Hipel, et al, 1993; Thomas, 2003).  The key element 
which makes DSSs necessary in brownfield redevelopment is the high amount of 
uncertainty.  From the very definition of brownfields proscribed by the USEPA there is 
uncertainty in the extent and existence of contamination at most brownfield sites 
(Greenberg et al, 1998; McCarthy, 2002).  Additionally, there is uncertainty to 
remediation and legal costs, future liability and legal risk as well as the amount of time 
necessary to undertake the projects.  Coffin (2003) notes that there is an uncertainty as to 
even how many brownfields are present in many communities.  Thus, the implementation 
of an appropriate decision support tool must be done with a high amount of research.  
This research refers not only to case studies of similar developments but to an inventory 
of the brownfields and contamination in a given region.  Such research or the adoption of 
a brownfield information system is needed for the affective use of a decision support 
tool.  To attempt to deal with uncertainty there are many different types of decision 
support tools, some of which have been applied to the field of brownfield redevelopment.  
Within the area of brownfield redevelopment there are two distinct types of decision 
support tools that can be found in literature and in practice.  The first type is simply an 
accessible information system which is used by the decision maker to fully comprehend 
the problem.  The second type of decision support tool is a system that attempts to 
synthesize a set of information be it social, economic or ecological to give strategic and 
tactical information.  This second type of decision support tool is referred to as a decision 
support system (DSS) and often involves the use of an analytical model.  Both types of 
decision support tools have their place within brownfield redevelopment and will be 
examined in this review. 
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A number of information resources are operated to aid brownfield decision makers 
in dealing with the risk and uncertainty involved in the redevelopment process.  The 
USEPA maintains a website outlining human health risks, preliminary remediation goals 
(PRGs) and risk assessments for brownfield sites.  The human health website outlines the 
calculation of exposure ratios and hazard quotients (USEPA, 2006a) This information is 
pertinent to all risk assessors and is valid not only in the United States but is referred to 
by the Health Canada Brownfields technical appendix as a valuable technical resource 
(Health Canada, 2005).  The USEPA’s PRG website gives information about soil 
calculations and physical chemical data and is intended to aid in the development of PRG 
“...tools for evaluating and cleaning up contaminated sites” (USEPA, 2006b).  The final 
link noted here is that dealing with the 8-step layout of the risk assessment and 
management procedure.  This resource allows assessors and other stakeholders to view 
the process that is undertaken in a brownfield management project.  The 8 steps outlined 
by the EPA are screening evaluation, exposure and risk calculation, problem formulation, 
study design, field sampling plan, site investigation and data analysis, risk 
characterization and risk management (USEPA, 2006).  In order to follow through and 
properly remediate, the indicators examined in the first section of this review are applied, 
through information on these websites to determine the appropriate actions. 
In the UK, the Environmental Information System for Planners (EISP) is a useful 
online resource for planners.  The EISP is set up to assist decisions in strategic planning, 
pre-planning enquiries and development control decisions.  Specifically, this DSS looks 
at: “…air quality, shallow undermining, landslide susceptibility, groundwater protection, 
flood risk, drainage, land contamination, proximity to landfill, biodiversity, natural and 
man-made heritage” (Culshaw, et al., 2006), all of which are essential environmental 
components to brownfield redevelopment. 
The goal of the EISP resources, similar to those of the USEPA risk management 
website is to “…make available to non-specialists, models, information and 
understanding covering a wide range of relevant scientific disciplines” (Culshaw, et. al, 
2006, 236).  The system is complex, using GIS to determine important information 
during the pre-planning stage.  The development control function of EISP is set up to 
“identify any primary constraint that has been triggered, and lead the user into the 
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relevant decision flow diagram, providing more detailed advice on, and analysis of, the 
environmental concerns” (Culshaw, et. al, 2006).  This system, much more detailed than 
the framework offered by the USEPA website, allows the planner access to a myriad of 
planning data, modeling information and scientific knowledge.  The strategic planning 
module is an extension of development control function module and gives the user access 
to information at a local level.  The system also includes flowcharts outlining the 
decision process for the use within the UK planning framework (Culshaw, et. al, 2006). 
The EISP is a highly powerful system that provides planners and non-technical 
users with the information needed to implement a planning development.  As the 
environmental issues addressed by the system are similar to those found in brownfield 
redevelopment projects, EISP seems to be an ideal system for addressing brownfield 
problems.  The system although extremely successful is limited unfortunately to only 
environmental issues, as is the USEPA website, and thus can only aid in the minimization 
of environmental impacts.   
In Thomas’ 2003 paper, a GIS-based decision support tool is suggested for the 
brownfield development process.  This decision support tool was intended to “(1) 
determine multi-stakeholder goals for site development, (2) identify and locate databases 
held by existing subcontractors; (3) determine a set of environmental indicators to 
quantify relevant factors and measure project success; and (4) identify specific 
brownfields sites to demonstrate the decision support application” (Thomas, 2003).  This 
system used site-specific data including geophysical data, socioeconomic factors, 
contaminant location and extents as well as the previous and future land use of the land to 
organize the sites and to establish trends.   
In order to implement the decision support tool, a number of previous developed 
systems were drawn upon.  The Regional Online Brownfields Inventory Network 
(ROBIN) was one such inventory website.  Here, Thompson found information about the 
sites available in Michigan including the size, level of contamination and the available 
infrastructure.  Unfortunately, as of the writing of this literature review, the ROBIN 
network was no longer online and thus the information is unavailable to decision makers. 
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Thompson notes that information for the selection of a redevelopment site has 
already been established by Devine (1996) and lists them as “… (a) an accurate inventory 
of available sites; (b) environmental compliance status, history of incidents, and any 
enforcement actions; (c) transportation access; (d) presence of linked industries; (e) 
availability of development incentives; and (f) labor pool characteristics” (Thompson, 
2003).    To define what land uses are preferable on a brownfield the researcher lists 
some criteria which may affect the final use.  The criteria include legal restrictions, 
physical restrictions, and types of contamination, community desires, site selection and 
professional judgment.  All of these criteria represent important inputs into the decision 
support tool being developed.  Further rankings were used to assign a quantitative value 
to the somewhat qualitative characteristics of the brownfields.  Using the outcome from 
these rankings, as well as inventory information a visual aid could be created in GIS to 
display the inventory of brownfields in the region along with how these brownfields fit 
into the criteria for site selection noted above.  Thompson found that a number of things 
needed to be improved in order to better improve the application of the decision support 
tool including a better analysis of user needs, more detailed and accurate information and 
the development and use of indicators to explain the state of a brownfield redevelopment 
project. 
 Sounderpandanian, et al. (2005), investigated the use of DSS to aid economic 
brownfield negotiations and proposed a system, which uses utility values and formulates 
the funding problems as an optimization problem solved using Solver in Microsoft Excel.   
As often there is limited information on whether there actually is contamination at the 
site, such information is often only found when the property changes hand and the 
contamination must be disclosed.  Thus, the researchers propose that there are three main 
decision makers involved in the process of brownfield remediation: the owner, purchaser 
and the government.  Using a willing to pay (WTP) factor, the DSS maximizes each DMs 
utility value to find an optimal solution that meets the restraints of the funding each DM 
has available.  For each scenario, all three decision makers’ WTP, subjective probability 
(SP), estimated income (EI), utility function, total cleanup cost (X) and optimal payment 
(OP) are determined.  If the sum of the WTPs is greater than or equal to the cost of the 
project, then the algorithm does not need to be run.  However, as it often is not, a solution 
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must be found to maximize each decision maker’s utility.  As they note, costs are 
continuously distributed but are estimated in discrete amounts.  Thus, the cost 
distribution is analyzed using an approximation developed by Clemen and Reilly (2001).  
Solving the associated utility functions, based on an estimated risk an optimal outcome is 
determined.      
 Looking into the repercussions of the various environmental and management 
affects that can be observed in environmental management conflicts, Sounderpandanian 
et al., 2005 express these in terms of costs.  The ramifications are that although the 
analysis is a useful means of expressing the economic difficulties encountered by a 
number of decision makers negotiating how much to contribute to a brownfield 
redevelopment project, applying cost values to socioeconomic and ecological goals is 
incredibly difficult.  Thus, although the DSS is a useful tool for economic negotiators, it 
does not take into account the full picture of why decision makers invest the amount of 
money and effort that they do towards specific goals. 
 Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) is a method of “assessing and 
comparing alternative solutions according to conflicting criteria” (Fraser and Hipel, 
1984).  Regan et. al (2005) uses MCDM to justify the need for formal decision making 
models in the field of environmental management, generally.   Justifying the need for 
structured decision making they point out that “[g]roup decision making is often the 
result of a laborious course of unstructured negotiation that rarely yields repeatable 
results or outcomes acceptable to the entire group” (Regan et. al, 2005). 
 To implement MCDM, the researchers first set up a decision tree containing the 
main points of criteria.  In the case of the research proposed  here, the branches of the 
tree were “(i) Improves quality of urban system; (ii) Provides for multiple park and 
recreational opportunities; (iii) Physical and visual accessibility; (iv) Regional strategic 
significance; (v) Threats; and (vi) Restores and maintains natural resource and/or 
working landscape values” (Regan et. al, 2005).  The criteria noted here was further 
broken down into sub-criteria that explained in a more detailed fashion, the criteria being 
examined.  The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) developed by Saaty (1980) is used to 
weight the various parts of the decision tree.  Using this weighting system, the 
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researchers give weight to the various criteria proposed according to a rank given by the 
stakeholder or DM themselves.  Under the AHP weighting was developed to fit the 
framework established by the California Legacy Project (CLP). 
 In the convergence model used to solve the system, “n agents with initial criterion 
weighting assignments 002
0
1 ...,, nppp for a particular hypothesis” are “assign[ed] a 
weighting of respect, wij, for herself and the other agents’, j, positions, where ∑ =1ijw ” 
(Regan et al., 2005).  The greater the value of wij the greater the weight that i places 
upon j and so forth.  Upon, the first iteration, player i's criterion weight will change and 
thus will be the weighted sum of the other criterion weights, as shown.   
 
This iteration continues until a consensus is achieved and all the criterion weights 
are equal.  Using this tool, a group consensus can be reached on how to weight different 
criteria that is important to brownfield redevelopment.   
 Regan, et al. claim that the most important intuition taken from this model is that 
consensus in a group setting can be achieved in time if each player or group member 
gives some weight to others opinions.  It is suggested by the researchers that as the 
formal model can show convergence and thus consensus, the burden of proof is on 
informal models to show their usefulness in urban planning. 
The development of technological DSSs and formal models in land-use planning 
has led to not only the use of GIS systems (Thomas, 2003) and MCDA (Regan et al., 
2005) but also to the use of expert systems (ES) or knowledge-based systems (KBS) 
(Witlox, 2005).  KBSs are seen as a refinement of artificial intelligence, where computer 
programs are developed to emulate human decision-making.  In order to create the KBS, 
information is transferred from literature or human experience to a computer system or 
program.  Citing Ortolano and Perman (1987), Witlox (2005) notes that there are 6 key 
criteria to be considered when implementing a KBS.  “These conditions stipulate that: (i) 
the knowledge is specialized and narrowly focused (precisely stated or well defined), (ii) 
true experts in the problem field exist, (iii) the task to be performed by the system is 
neither trivial nor exceedingly difficult, (iv) the conventional techniques (i.e. other 
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computer programmes, spreadsheets) are inadequate to perform the task, (v) the payoff 
from the KBS is significant, and (vi) the expert(s) is (are) willing to cooperate” (Witlox, 
2005, 438).   
Witlox notes that although the “state of knowledge in the field of … locational 
planning is insufficiently good to permit its representation and integration in an 
intelligent automated planning (expert) system…this does not mean that KBS will have 
no role to play in locational planning” (Witlox, 2005, 439).  Further he argues that the 
use of KBS as a DSS is justified as DSSs often deal with unstructured or semi-structured 
problems. 
The Matisse-Knowledge Based Decision Support System (Matisse-KBDSS) was 
developed by Witlox in his 2000 paper.  The system uses three criteria to aid in the 
determination of a site location; site conditions, investment considerations and operating 
considerations.  Using this criteria, Matisse-KBDSS matches “…the spatial production 
requirements of an economic activity (i.e. the actor) with the attributes characterizing the 
location alternatives (i.e. the object)” (Witlox, 2005).  In many ways the Matisse-KBDSS 
acts like a multiple-criteria-decision-maker (MCDM) tool where a decision maker must 
choose between a group of possible options by using weighted selection criteria. 
The implementation of Matisse-KBDSS as well as MCDMs are important tools for 
making complex decisions.  However, the key pitfall of both of these systems is that they 
take into account only one decision maker.  Studies by Greenberg (1998), McCarthy 
(2002), De Sousa (2003, 2002) and Dair and Williams (2006) amongst others note that 
the implementation of brownfield redevelopment projects is a process that involves many 
interest parties.   
To summarize the use of decision support systems in brownfield redevelopment, 
Table 4.2 lists the advantages, disadvantages and areas of application of those reviewed 
in the proceeding section.  
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The application of GMCR, as described in Section 4.4, represents a potential 
exploration of strategic decision support, an area that has been until recently,  
4.4 Strategic Brownfield Decision Tools 
The majority of brownfield DSSs developed so far have focused on the economic 
and environmental issues at play.  Web resources such as the USEPA and Health Canada 
give important technical data while the EISP system uses the power of multiple servers 
and GIS to allow planners access to important technical and demographic information.  
Other systems such as the EISP system developed by Thomas (2003, 2006) and the 
 
Table 4.2. Decision support systems and decision tools in brownfield redevelopment 
Decision Tool (Reference) Advantages/Disadvantages/Application  
USEPA Brownfield Risk 
Management Websites (USA), 
Environmental Information 
System for Planners (UK) 
• Sets out stringent remediation guidelines 
• Outlines goals of remediation 
• Tactical information 
• Does not provide specific case based information but general 
information 
• Applied to risk assessment calculations 
GIS (Thomas, 2003) • Determine multi-stakeholder goals for site development 
• Identify and locate databases held by existing subcontractors 
• Determine a set of environmental indicators to quantify relevant 
factors and measure project success 
• Difficult to determine the state of projects 
• Applied to determination of availability of brownfield lands and 
the success of previously redeveloped properties 
Willingness to Pay /Cost 
Distribution (Sounderpandian, et 
al., 2005) 
• Tactical support tool used to determine cost-sharing between 
seller, buyer and local government 
• Used to determine multi-stakeholder goals for site development 
Multiple Critera Decision 
Making (Regan, et al., 2005) 
• Multiple criteria ranked using analytical hierarchal process to 
determine viability of a brownfield project: Improves quality of 
urban system; (ii) Provides for multiple park and recreational 
opportunities; (iii) Physical and visual accessibility; (iv) Regional 
strategic significance; (v) Threats; and (vi) Restores and 
maintains natural resource and/or working landscape values 
• Allows decision makers to rank developments based on pre-
defined criteria to determine an acceptable group outcome 
• Relies on numerical scores to determine weights that may be 
qualitative in nature 
• Based on decisions of one DM or group of DMs 
• Applied to redevelopment plan selection; group consensus 
The Matisse-Knowledge Based 
Decision Support System 
(Wiltox, 2005) 
• Aid in the determination of a site location 
• Uses three criteria: site conditions, investment considerations and 
operating considerations  
• Based on decisions of one DM or group of DMs 
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ROBIN system attempt to provide accurate inventories of land for urban planners and 
city consultants. 
There has also been a large development of more complex, mathematical systems 
in the area of brownfield redevelopment as well.  The MCDA method developed by 
Regan et al. (2005) allows for the analysis of land use decisions using weighted criteria 
chosen by the involved decision makers while Sounderpandanian et al. (2005) use a 
convergence method to negotiate financial disputes between the buyer, seller and local 
government in brownfield sale conflicts.  However, there is a gap in the development of 
methods to analyse and resolve the strategic-level conflicts that are involved in the 
brownfield redevelopment process.  Applications of the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution to strategic analyses of environmental conflicts are well-documented, as noted 
in Chapter 1. The use of the GMCR models explained in this review is a logical next step 
in the analysis of brownfield conflicts. Walker et, al. (2008), broke down brownfield 
conflicts into three sections as shown in Figure 4.1 for the application of GMCR to 
brownfield redevelopment projects.  A more specific model is shown in Chapter 5 in the 
analysis of the Kaufman Lofts renovation. 
 
An important reason for developing methods to apply GMCR to brownfield 
redevelopment is its relative simplicity.  Slee (2006) notes that although the framework 
may seem mathematical to some it can be used to quite clearly show how individual 







Figure 4.1. Series of conflicts in brownfield projects 
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as chicken, important philosophical concepts such as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin, 1968) and environmental resource allocation and restoration conflicts (Fraser 
and Hipel, 1984; Hipel, et al., 1993) have all been shown to fit within this framework.  
The models developed by Fang, et al. (1993), Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Howard 
(1971) and illustrated by Slee (2006) are powerful enough to allow for greater insights 
and potentially greater brownfield policy solutions.  The application of GMCR to 
environmental conflicts is not new and has been shown to model both the GDU conflict 
mentioned previously as well as the Elmira Uniroyal conflict quite well (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984; Fang, et al., 1993; Znotinas and Hipel, 1979).  Brownfield redevelopment 
projects provide an opportunity to incorporate GMCR techniques to a pressing 
environmental, economic and social issue. Moreover, attitudes and coalition analysis, 
defined in Chapters 3 and 2, respectively, for extending the GMCR methodology are 
valuable for providing insights into the strategic aspects of brownfield redevelopment 
and environmental management disputes. 
4.5 Summary 
 The review of literature presented here shows the need for implementing strategic 
conflict analysis methods.  Previous DSSs implemented in brownfields redevelopment 
have focused on quantitative methods using cardinal values and weights (Regan, et al., 
2005; Sounderpandian, et. al, 2005).  This approach has been successful for models that 
focus on economic or environmental data.  However, there is a gap in the application of 
qualitative models to brownfield problems. In the next chapter, two brownfield conflicts 
will be examined through the application of GMCR. 
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Systematic tools are useful for and have been applied to a myriad of environmental 
conflicts. One common tool that has been used in this area is multiple criteria decision 
analysis (MCDA) where various alternatives are measured against a set of weighted 
criteria. Hipel (1992) explored the application of multiple objective decision making to 
the Three Gorges Dam project while Rajabi, et al. (2001) examined the allocation of 
water resources in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence region using MCDA. The Graph Model 
for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) also lends itself very well to the analysis of 
environmental conflicts. These conflicts, like many other negotiations, are made up of 
wide variety of decision makers (DMs) with separate agendas that a strategic decision 
support, like GMCR, is extremely useful for providing all involved with a clearer picture. 
Hipel, et al. (1997) describes the application of GMCR as an environmental conflict 
management tool and apply the framework to the Flathead River Dispute of 1988. 
Groundwater contamination (Fang, et al., 1993), sustainable development (Hamouda et 
al., 2004) and the implications of dam construction (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) have also 
been examined successfully using GMCR. Brownfield conflicts are analyzed in the 
following sections using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) in order to 
find insights into the types of attitudes and actions that are needed to create resolutions 
that are satisfactory of all DMs.  
5.2 Brownfield Conflicts 
From the analysis of private brownfield redevelopment and in conversation with a 
brownfield expert in the City of Kitchener (Boutilier, 2007) brownfield negotiations are 
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broken down into three central conflicts as shown in Fig. 5.1. Starting from the left and 
moving towards the right with time, the three conflicts are property acquisition, 
remediation planning and finally renovation. Each of the arrows illustrates the 
involvement of different decision makers in the process at different times. In the analysis 
that will follow, each of the three nodes will be analyzed using appropriate systems 
methodologies. The following case study of the Kaufman redevelopment, in section 5.3, 
is from the manuscript by Walker, et al. (2008). 
 
5.3 Kaufman Lofts 
5.3.1 History of Kaufman Factory in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada 
The site of the Kaufman Footwear factory lies at the corner of King Street and 
Victoria Street in downtown Kitchener. A tall imposing building, the factory is a symbol 
of the city’s downtown revitalization. Its large windows, designed to allow in maximum 
lighting during the day, and its high roofline reflect a bygone era of industrial 
architecture. This building has been a prominent part of Kitchener’s urban landscape 
since its construction was completed in 1925.The structure was designed by Albert Kahn, 
an influential architect whose style and design methods greatly impacted industrial 
designs worldwide. The company that still bears his name was founded in 1895 and his 
work in Detroit on major automotive plants greatly influenced the face of the ‘Detroit 















renaissance’ (AKA, 2007). By the time the building was constructed, Kahn had already 
established himself as a superior industrial architect and entrepreneur (Hildebrand, 1974). 
Kaufman Footwear was established by Alfred Kaufman and his father Jacob in 
1907. Their Kitchener factory opened in the city formerly referred to as Berlin in 1908 
and construction on the facility was eventually completed in 1925. From its opening in 
1908 until its closure in 2000, the Kaufman factory was the workplace of thousands of 
members of the community, employing as many as 1600 people in 1996 (Pender, 2004; 
Globe and Mail, 2005). The Sorel shoe, introduced in 1960, was one of the most well-
known products produced by the Kaufman brand, coinciding with a period of great 
prosperity for the company. In the 1990s, however, the company struggled financially 
and by 1998 the first of many layoffs began at Kaufman due to poor sales. Finally, in 
2000 Kaufman Footwear went bankrupt and the property went into the receivership of 
Ernst and Young (Pender, 2004; University of Waterloo, 2005). 
At the time of Kaufman’s bankruptcy, the City of Kitchener became aware of 
contamination beneath the property. Due to the production of fire safety boots on the site, 
liquid naphthalene was stored onsite in an underground tank. In the 1990s, when the tank 
was removed, employees found that the tank had many holes, the ground smelled of 
naphthalene and that the soil was stained. Although effort was made by Kaufman’s 
employees to remove the stained soil, an appropriate cleanup was not completed and a 
plume of naphthalene was left below the property (OCETA, 2007).  
5.3.2 Acquisition Conflict 
The first conflict node, as shown in Figure 5.1, is the acquisition conflict. In this 
conflict, one party is attempting to purchase the property as cheaply as possible while 
obtaining the most benefits possible from the local government. The property owner, 
meanwhile, is trying to earn as high a profit as possible. 
5.3.3 Graph Model of the Acquisition Conflict 
The first conflict within a private brownfield renovation is the acquisition of the 
brownfield property by a third party, usually a developer (D) or real estate company. As 
mentioned previously, the other two DMs would be the property owner (PO) or receiver 
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and the city government (CG) whose job it is to entice the buyer into purchasing the 
property. The three DMs and their respective options are displayed in Table 5.1. 
 
From Table 5.1, it can be seen that there are three DMs with a total of six options 
and thus a total 26 possible states each represented with Y/N notation. The “Y” or “N” in 
each column represents that the option has or has not been taken, respectively. For 
example, at state 8, PO elects to ‘Sell High’ but not ‘Sell Low’ or ‘Walk’, CG does not 
offer ‘incentives’ and D decides to ‘Buy’ and not ‘Walk’. Due to the mutual 
exclusiveness of some of the options, there are a large number of infeasible states. This 
means that both of these DMs can only choose one option at a time. For example, PO can 
choose to either sell high or sell low and not both options simultaneously. An additional 
notable feature of the options listed here is that both D and PO have the ability to leave 
the conflict by walking away from negotiations, as seen in options 3 and 6, labeled 
‘walk’. When this option is taken the conflict moves to state 13. At this state, it does not 
matter whether the PO or D have selected the option only that the negotiation has broken 
down. Additionally, at state 13, the actions of CG have no impact. A move of this type is 
referred to as a common move as both DMs can unilaterally move the conflict to the 
same state. For the sake of this conflict, this common move is irreversible as it is 
assumed that if one party ‘walks’, the negotiations have ended. Within this conflict 
model, this common move is considered to be one-way in that after a DM has walked 
away from the negotiations, they cannot return. Thus as PO and D haggle about the price 
and whether or not to make a deal for the ownership of the property either DM can 
independently end the conflict. As this move is one-way, it is represented by a 
unidirectional arrow in Figure 5.2.  
Table 5.1. Decision Makers, Options and States in the Acquisition Conflict 
PO 
1. Sell High N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y N -/N 
2. Sell Low N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y -/N 
3. Walk N N N N N N N N N N N N -/Y 
CG 4. Incentives N N N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y - 
D 5. Buy N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y N/- 6. Walk N N N N N N N N N N N N Y/- 




Following the identification of all the feasible states in the conflict, a ranking of 
states based on a DM’s given preferences is developed for all DMs in the given conflict. 
For each of the DMs the preferences are based on simple motivations, as follows. D is a 
person or corporation whose purpose is to make wise investments for financial gain. 
Thus, D prefers to purchase the property at low cost in order to maximize profit. PO may 
be different depending on the specific brownfield being studied. Regardless of who the 
owner of the brownfield property is, the aim of PO is to sell for as great a price as the 
market will bear. For the sake of this analysis, the potential costs have been broken down 
into ‘sell high’ and ‘sell low’. These options could also be rewritten as ‘sell above market 
value’ or ‘sell below market value’. Certainly, these options could be expanded further; 
however, for the sake of the analysis herein, the two options will suffice. The motivation 
of CG is to use local taxpayers’ money as effectively as possible. Thus, an investment in 
incentives is useful only if it causes development to occur. The overriding motivation for 
CG is to ensure that some sort of agreement is reached between PO and D in order that 
the vacant property will be reused. Using these motivations, the state rankings were 
determined and listed in Table 2 where the states are ranked from most preferred on the 
left to least preferred on the right for which states contained within brackets are equally 
preferred. For example, for PO states 8 and 11 are equally preferred as they are in the 
same set of parentheses. These states are equally preferred because, as shown in Table 1, 
they both represent D purchasing the property at the higher price. PO does not care 
whether CG offers incentives, representing the difference between states 8 and 11, as 
they do not change the profit made by PO from selling at the higher price. 
 
Using the option form of the conflict in Table 5.1, the movements of the DMs can 
be expressed as a directed graph. In a directed graph, the arrows represent the potential 
movements by the different DMs between the different nodes or states, as per the 
definition of GMCR. The different patterns of the arcs represent the different DMs who 
Table 5.2. Ranking of States 
DM State Rankings 
PO (8, 11), (1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 10), (3, 6, 13), (9, 12) 
CG (8, 9), (11, 12), (1, 2, 3, 7), (4, 5, 6, 10), 13 
D 12, 9, 11, 10, 6, 5, (3, 4), (1, 2, 7, 13), 8 
Equally preferred states are denoted by parentheses. 
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are responsible for the particular movement while the arrowheads denote whether the 
moves are reversible or irreversible. As noted earlier, the only irreversible move is the 
common move available to both PO and D to state 13. In Figure 5.2, an integrated 
directed graph is shown where all of the movements of all the DMs are shown 
simultaneously. 
 
Using the preferences rankings from Table 5.2 and the integrated directed graph in 
Figure 5.2, the acquisition conflict can be analyzed. The conflict is displayed in tableau 
form with each DM’s ranking of states listed left to right from most to least preferred. 
Below each state are the UIs that the DM has from that state. As noted earlier, equally 
preferred states are in parenthesis within the state ranking. Using the solution concepts 
from Definitions 4 and 10 in Chapter 2, stabilities and, thus, equilibria can be determined 
as shown in Table 5.3. 















Using these two solution concepts to equilibria found at states 1, 2, 4, 7, 11 and 13. 
Only one of these states corresponds to a situation where D buys and PO sells and, thus, 
the current model for this conflict contains only one equilibrium state that satisfies all the 
involved DMs. A telling sign is that none of the three DMs have unilateral improvements 
away from the status quo, preferring that the other DM(s) to make the first move towards 
a compromise. Thus, in order to achieve an outcome that benefits both the CG and D a 
new approach needs to be taken. 
To illustrate the application of the solution concepts in Table 3, state 8 is examined. 
As for both PO and CG, R+i (8) =φ  and thus, by Definition 4, state 8 is Nash stable for 
both DMs. For D, however, state 8 has two unilateral improvements as R+i(8) = {2, 13}. 
As R+CG(2) = R+CG(13) = R+PO(2) = R+PO(13) = φ  neither PO nor CG have any credible 
moves that can sanction D and, hence, 8 is unstable (U) for D. As state 8 is stable for 
only two of the three DMs, state 8 is not at equilibrium and is marked with an X. 
5.3.4 Attitudes in the acquisition conflict 
The City of Kitchener, mentioned earlier, uses numerous enticements to encourage 
investment in local brownfields. Rebates are provided on fees for building permits related 
to the renovation or redevelopment of a brownfield property while developmental fees 
related to the need for increased infrastructure are waived. Additional assistance from the 
City of Kitchener comes in the form of Tax Incremental Financing, or TIF, whereby 
developers pay a reduced taxation rate after they have completed the renovation or 
Table 5.3. Tableau form of acquisition conflict 
 X E E E X X E X X X E X X 
 N N N N N N S U U U N U U 
PO (8 11) (1 2 4 5 7 10) (3 6 13) (9 12) 









 N N S S N N N N U U U U N 
CG (8 9) (11 12) (1 2 3 7) (4 5 6 10) 13 
   8 9     1 2 3 7  
 N N N N S S S S N N N N U 
D 12 9 11 10 6 5 (3 4) (1 2 7 13) 8 
     12 11 9 10     2, 13 
E-Equilibrium state, X-Non-equilibrium state, N-Nash stable, S-Sequentially stable, U-unstable 
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redevelopment of the brownfield property. The amount saved is equal to the amount 
spent for remediation of the property and allows the developer an opportunity to recoup 
these costs up to the first one million dollars (CDN$). The final incentive offered by the 
City is that of a liaison between the City and the developer (Boutilier, 2007). The liaison 
helps the developer to prepare the property for its final use and deal with the various 
committees and organizations that are involved in property redevelopment. This 
incentive is one of the most important for potential developers as it allows the developer 
to work closely with the City and increases the likelihood that the project will be 
completed successfully, on time and with the least hassle. 
In the previous analysis, it was assumed that each of the three DMs had ‘rational 
attitudes’, meaning that they had positive attitudes towards themselves and indifference 
towards all other DMs. In the analysis of the acquisition conflict, it is useful to determine 
what impact a change of attitudes would have on the equilibrium and on the potential 
moves that would be needed to move from the status quo to a desirable equilibrium or 
equilibria. As CG is responsible for trying to broker a deal between PO and D, it is 
feasible to suggest that the relationships between CG and PO or D impact the final 
outcome of the conflict. Using the attitude definitions created for GMCR by Inohara et al. 
(2007), three analyses are performed. In these analyses, the impact of CG holding 
positive attitudes towards either PO or D while holding indifferent attitudes towards itself 
are examined.  
 
Table 5.4. Varying attitudes of CG 
Original Analysis 
DM PO CG D 
PO + 0 0 
CG 0 + 0 
D 0 0 + 
Case 1 
DM PO CG D 
PO + 0 0 
CG + 0 0 
D 0 0 + 
Case 2 
DM PO CG D 
PO + 0 0 
CG 0 0 + 
D 0 0 + 
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The application of the attitudes in Table 5.4 alters the outcome of the conflict by 
changing which states are less or more preferred for CG at each state. The reachable lists 
at each state s for CG, RCG(s), remain the same however the UI lists, RCG+(s), are 
replaced by the total relational reply lists, TRRCG(s). Since both PO and D have rational 
attitudes, the total relational reply lists of both DMs are equal to their UI lists. This can 
be written as TRRD(s) = RD+(s) and TRRPO(s) = RPO+(s), for cases 1 and 2. As explained 
in Definitions 21 through 26 in Chapter 3, the TRR lists consist of the states which 
satisfy the relational preferences held by a given DM, which are defined by the DMs 
attitudes towards the other DMs in the conflict. Thus, the set TRRCG(s) will change 
depending upon the attitudes being analyzed. 
 
In Table 5.5, the total relational reply lists are given for each state s in the conflict. 
In Case 1, there are no total relational replies for any of the states, except for the states 
themselves. This means that none of the reachable states are devoting preferences for CG 
with respect to PO and thus for CG all states are relational Nash stable. The change of 
attitudes on the part of CG greatly affects the potential movements that can be made and 
thus the various stabilities and equilibria. Applying the new total relational reply list for 
CG in Case 1, it can be seen that equilibria occur at states 1, 2, 4, 7, 11 and 13 and that 
each state is relational Nash stable for CG, as CG has no total relational replies. Although 
there are a high number of potential equilibria there are no unilateral movements away 
from state 1 that are not sanctioned. As there are no unsanctioned moves away from the 
status quo that correspond to the attitudes being analyzed in Case 1, the conflict would 
remain at the state 1. Thus, although there are six equilibria listed in Table 5.6, only state 
1 represents the outcome of the conflict in this case. 
Table 5.5. TRR Lists for CG in Acquisition Conflict 
S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
TRRCG(s) – Case 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 






12 10 11 12 13 
69 
 
In Table 5.7 the attitudes TRR lists of CG in Case 2 are applied to the system. 
Under this analysis the two equilibria for the system are 11 and 13.  Again, the relational 
solution concepts can be applied to determine the various stable states and system 
equilibria.  For example, state 3 is a non-equilibrium state according to the relational 
stability concepts from Definitions 29 and 32. At state 3, PO has three total relational 
replies, as defined in Definition 26, to states 1, 2 and 3. Because PO holds rational 
attitudes, the TRR can be seen as comparable to a list of unilateral improvements with 
equally preferred states included.  From states 1 and 2, D cannot sanction PO as 
2)2(,1)1( == DD TRRTRR  and thus cannot move to sanction D. CG, however, has TRRs 
from states 1 and 2 such that 5,2)2(,4,1)1( == CGCG TRRTRR , respectively. However, as PO 
relationally prefers 4 to 1 and 5 to 2 such that 14 POTRP  and 25 POTRP , CG cannot sanction 
PO and thus state 3 is unstable for PO. Using this methodology to systematically analyze 
each state`s equilibrium conditions are determined for the conflict. 
 
Table 5.7. Tableau form of acquisition conflict – Case 2 
 X E X X X X X X X X E X X 
 RN RN RN RN RN RN RS U U U RN U U 
PO (8 11) (1 2 4 5 7 10) (3 6 13) (9 12) 




 U U RN RN U U RS U RN RN RN RN RN 
CG (8 9) (11 12) (1 2 3 7) (4 5 6 10) 13 
 11 12   4 5 6 10      
 RN RN RN RN RS U RS U RN RN RN RN U 
D 12 9 11 10 6 5 (3 4) (1 2 7 13) 8 
     12 11 9 10     2, 13 
E-Equilibrium state, X-Non-equilibrium state, RN-Relational Nash stable, RS-Relational Sequentially stable, U-unstable 
Note: the states listed below the ranking of states for each DM represent the TRR lists for the given DM at the state
Table 5.6. Tableau form of acquisition conflict – Case 1 
 X E E E E X E X X X E X X 
 RN RN RN RN RN RN RS U U U RN U U 
PO (8 11) (1 2 4 5 7 10) (3 6 13) (9 12) 




 RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN RN 
CG (8 9) (11 12) (1 2 3 7) (4 5 6 10) 13 
 RN RN RN RN RS U RS RS RN RN RN RN U 
D 12 9 11 10 6 5 (3 4) (1 2 7 13) 8 
     12 11 9 10     2, 13 
E-Equilibrium state, X-Non-equilibrium state, RN-Relational Nash stable, RS-Relational Sequentially stable, U-unstable 
Note: the states listed below the ranking of states for each DM represent the TRR lists for the given DM at the state, 
without including the state itself.
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Since CG has a total relational reply from state 1, the status quo is no longer an 
equilibrium state. Following the unilateral improvements made by each DM the conflict 
moves to state 11 where CG offers enticements, PO sells at a high price and D purchases 
the property. 
Figure 3 shows the moves made by the three DMs to get from state 1 to state 11. As 
can be seen, CG first moves the conflict from state 1, the status quo where no options are 
selected to state 4 by offering incentives, D moves the dispute from 4 to 10 by agreeing 
to buy in the area with incentives offered and, finally, PO moves the conflict from state 
10 to 11 by putting the property up for sale to the enticed D.  
 
The conclusion of this analysis is that a movement by CG that is counter to its own 
preferences and rational preferences in the short term can in the long run cause the 
conflict to move to a more preferred state. First, CG offers incentives which attract 
interest from purchasers allowing a deal to occur between PO and D. As noted by Inohara 
et al. (2007), when DMs make moves that are counter to their own immediate gain, they 
may lead the conflict to an outcome that is more suitable for all involved. Further, the 
application of positive attitudes to CG are accurate as they represent CG’s willingness to 
offer a staff member and numerous other incentives in order to foster a deal. 
The second conflict in the series of conflicts needed to continue the renovation or 
redevelopment project is that of determining the appropriate remediation method. The 













Figure 5.3. Movements leading to the equilibrium in Case 2 
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physical conditions as well as financial and legal limitations. Within the province of 
Ontario, obtaining a Record of Site Condition (RSC) for a brownfield property is the 
main goal of any remediation project (MOE, 2007). The following sections examine the 
conflicts involved with the remediation selection within the context of the Kaufman 
renovation. 
5.3.5 Site Division 
During the renovation of the Kaufman property a site division was necessary in 
order to undertake the needed remediation. Although site division is not a necessary step 
in all renovations or redevelopments on a brownfield property, it is useful to analyze the 
conflict for completeness here. The Kaufman property purchased by Kimshaw Holdings 
in 2004 comprises a large land area in downtown Kitchener. The original factory 
building, to be renovated for use as lofts, sits at the corner of King and Victoria streets 
and faces towards King Street. Behind the original factory is a large piece of land that 
borders on Victoria Street and formerly held the offending storage tank. The goal of 
dividing this property into two pieces was to place all of the contamination on a property 
behind the building that would be remediated while the renovation took place. Only one 
piece of the original factory sat above contaminated soil and thus, as soon as that piece 
was remediated, the building could be inhabited, provided that the property was divided. 
In order that all of the contamination be maintained on the one property and thus only 
one record of site condition (RSC) was necessary a horizontal severance was needed 
(XCG, 2004). Such severances are special in the case of brownfield projects and are more 
often applied to instances including dividing land underground for city use in the 
building of subway lines (Buttigieg, 2007). Horizontal severances have been seen as a 
potentially negative planning tool by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) which is 
concerned that it could be used by DMs to step away from their responsibility to 
remediate contaminated subsurface soil by relieving the property owner or developer of 
ownership of the contamination (MOE, 2007). Others argue that the use of such a 




The option form of the site division conflict is shown in Table 5.8. The Committee 
of Adjustment (CA) is made up of former city representatives, lawyers and real estate 
experts with a vast knowledge of the City’s bylaws. CA’s responsibility is to determine 
whether the subdivision of a property into two or three sections satisfies local bylaws and 
the planning act (City of Kitchener, 2006a). At this stage, a City planner, representing 
CG, works with D to develop an appropriate site division plan. In the options shown 
above, it is assumed that CA must choose one of the three options and that CG can advise 
D on the appropriate site division plan and that D can accept this advice or not. For this 
analysis, it is assumed that CG has a firm grasp as to what types of plans CA will or will 
not accept. Using this assumption about the knowledge of CG and the option form in 















PCA={(7, 6, 3), 8, (2, 5), (1, 4), 9} 
PCG={1, 7, 4, 2, 8, 5, (3, 6, 9)} 
PD={(1, 4, 7), (2, 5, 8), (3, 6, 9)} 
Table 5.8. Options in site division conflict 
Decision Maker Options          
Committee of 
Adjustment (CA) 
Accept Y N N Y N N Y N N 
Accept with 
conditions 
N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Reject N N Y N N Y N N Y 
City Planner (CG) Advise D N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Developer (D) Accept advice - - - N N N Y Y Y 
State ID  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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In Figure 5.4, the arrows represent the strategic moves and countermoves available 
to each of the DMs, while the sets of states below the graph represent a ranking of states 
from most to least preferred for each of the DMs. The assumption behind the ranking of 
states for CA is that if CG offers advice and D follows this advice, CA is likely to 
approve the plan. However, if CG does not offer advice or D does not follow the given 
advice, CA will prefer not to approve the plan or to approve with recommendations. 
CG’s preference is that the plan be approved and that if they advise D that the plan will 
be accepted. D’s preference ranking is simply a preference that the plan be approved, 
accepted with conditions, or rejected respectively. From information in Figure 5.4, the 
conflict can be analyzed in tableau form. 
 
After performing a simple analysis of the conflict, it can be seen that equilibria 
exist at states 3, 6 and 7. These correspond to the states where CA rejects the application 
and CG does not offer advice, CA rejects the application and CG offers advice and D 
does not take the advice and the case where CA accepts the application that is advised by 
CG and D accepts the advice. These states are logical equilibria, as they are the most 
preferred states of CA, the committee who’s decision are responsible for the final 
outcome. Given that these states represent the stable equilibria, it is in CG’s and D’s best 
interest to work together to create a plan that will be approved by CA, based on the 
assumptions of this model. 
5.3.6 Remediation Selection 
In the purchase and redevelopment of a brownfield property one of the main 
financial burdens is that of remediation of the contaminated soil. In the Province of 
Table 5.9. Tableau form of site division conflict 
 E E E X X X X X X 
 N N N U U U U U U 
CA (7 6 3) 8 (2 5) (1 4) 9 
    7 3 6 2, 3 5, 6 8, 7 
 N N U N N S N N N 
CG 1 7 4 2 8 5 (3 6 9) 
   1   2    
 N N N N N N N N N 
D (1 4 7) (2 5 8) (3 6 9) 
E-Equilibrium state, X-Non-equilibrium state, N- Nash stable, S- Sequentially stable, U-unstable 
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Ontario, it is the duty of the property owner to decontaminate the offending soil 
according to either generic levels provided by the MOE or by a remediation plan, 
referred to as a site-specific risk assessment (SSRA). The goal of the SSRA is to outline 
what exposure risk exists on the property and to point out what areas of the property need 
to be remediated, while generic levels refer to levels of contaminant concentration that 
are deemed acceptable. In general, all of the DMs involved in a brownfield project would 
prefer that the property is decontaminated to generic levels set by the MOE. However, 
sometimes such a cleanup is not feasible, whether it be for financial or physical reasons. 
In such cases, a SSRA is undertaken to determine whether the contaminants that are 
present pose any threat to the environment or public health (MOE, 1996).  
The goal for the developer of this remediation process is to obtain an RSC which 
allows the developer to renovate or redevelop the property towards its final use. MOE 
provides a road map of the conflicts involved in this process (MOE, 2004). An adapted 
version of the flow diagram is shown in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, obtaining an RSC by performing an SSRA instead of 
remediating to generic standards is a task that involves the preparation of an SSRA and 
additional approvals. For the Kaufman Loft project, the King Street property that 






















remediated to generic MOE contaminant guidelines. One reason for the SSRA on the 
King St. property was the presence of Naphtha contamination below the corner of the 
building, the other was to ensure that the presence of other contaminants were not 
harmful to building workers or future residents. As in the previous conflict of site 
division, the MOE does not have a specific preference as to whether to accept or reject 
either the SSRA or the RSC. However, the MOE does want the SSRA to account for any 
potential harm to both human health and the environment, as this is part of the mandate 
of the MOE. Thus, if the SSRA or its accompanying remediation plan is deficient, it is 
certain to be rejected. Additionally, the MOE expects “…that the large majority of site 
remediations will be based on generic criteria…”, (MOE, 1996) putting pressure on D to 
remediate to a generic standard, if possible. 
5.3.7 Renovation/Redevelopment 
The final conflict node in the brownfield redevelopment process depicted in Figure 
1 is that of the renovation of the building itself. For the Kaufman renovation, the conflict 
could be seen as involving D and two other DMs consisting of Heritage Kitchener and 
the city building inspectors. The building inspectors ensure that work is done properly to 
ensure the safety of future residents of the lofts. Any conflicts between D and the 
inspectors would be dependent upon the work of the construction contractor hired by D. 
In the case of the Kaufman renovation, Kimshaw Holdings had no such conflicts with 
building inspectors from the City of Kitchener. The second DM, however, was involved 
in a conflict with Kimshaw Holdings during the Kaufman renovation. Heritage Kitchener 
is a group that “advises Council on matters involving conservation of publicly and 
privately owned heritage resources within Kitchener and is the City's local architectural 
conservation advisory committee as defined in the Ontario Heritage Act” (City of 
Kitchener, 2006b). As such, Heritage Kitchener (HK) approves or rejects plans and sends 
its recommendations to City council. The vision of HK has been one of conservation as 
opposed to preservation. Thus, for the Kaufman phase the goal was to conserve some of 
the key architectural features of the building, in keeping with the work of the building’s 
architect; renowned industrial architect Albert Kahn. One key element of Kahn’s work 
was that of uniform lighting, achieved through the use of large windows (AKA, 2003). 
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Another important architectural element is that of the high roof lines prominent in so 
many of Kahn’s works.  
In the renovation of the Kaufman building, the original intended renovation 
developed by architects for Kimshaw Holdings, had a greatly modified roofline that was 
not in keeping with the original architecture of the building. If one labels this 
unsatisfactory plan ‘A’ and an acceptable plan which does follow the guidelines of 
Heritage Kitchener ‘B’, the conflict in option form is shown in Table 5.10.  
 
Taking the states from the option form shown in Table 5.10, the ranking of states is 
determined and shown in Table 5.11. The main difficulty for D within this process is that 
it may not know the preferences of HK. For the case of the Kaufman renovation, city 
planners helped Kimshaw Holdings come up with an alternative to the original plan in 
order to better satisfy the desires of HK. To demonstrate the importance that 
misperception has on the outcome of the conflict, a hypergame will be analyzed. Wang et 
al. (1988), defines a hypergame as a conflict where one or more DMs have a 
misunderstanding or misperception of the conflict. When performing sensitivity analyses 
of a conflict it is common to employ hypergames to analyze situations where DMs are 
unaware of potential options, DMs or changes in attitudes. To analyze a conflict with 
misunderstanding, one must posit what crucial information is misinterpreted or 
misunderstood.  
Table 5.10. Option form of renovation conflict 
DM Option     
D 
A Y N Y N 
B N Y N Y 
HK 
Approve Y Y N N 
Reject N N Y Y 
State ID 1 2 3 4
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In the first-level hypergame proposed here, D is unaware of HKs preferences and, 
thus, in D’s conflict HK prefers all four states equally. In HK’s conflict, HK is aware 
only that D prefers its plan to be approved. In the hypergame, the conflicts are modeled 
with respect to the views of D and HK. States that are equilibrium for both conflicts are 
deemed to be overall equilibria and thus equilibrium results for the overall hypergame. 
As can be seen from Table 5.12, the only overall equilibrium that occurs is that of state 3 
where D chooses the unsatisfactory plan ‘A’ and HK rejects it. This simple example 
using a hypergame in GMCR illustrates how misperception and misunderstanding can 
manifest themselves and sidetrack negotiations between D and HK. 
 
On the other hand, if the DMs are aware of each other’s preferences, the outcome is 
much different. The lower conflict tableau in Table 5.12 represents the case where both 
DMs are aware of each other’s preferences and is analyzed to the equilibria at states 2 
and 3. These two outcomes correspond to HK approving plan B or rejecting plan A. The 
Table 5.12. Hypergame in the renovation conflict 
Overall EQ X X E X 
D’s EQ E X E E 
Stab. R U R R 
D 1 2 (3 4) 
UIs  1   
Stab. R R R R 
HK (1 2 3 4) 
UIs - - - - 
     
HK’s EQ X E E X 
Stab. R R R R 
D (1 2) (3 4) 
UIs - - - - 
Stab. R R U U 
HK 2 3 (4 1) 
UIs   2 3 
 
Table 5.11. Preference rankings as seen by D and HK 
DM Preference ranking as seen by HK 
D 1 > 2 > (3,4) 
HK 2 > 3 > (4,1) 
DM Preference ranking as seen by D 
D 1 > 2 > (3,4) 
HK (1, 2, 3, 4) 
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essential difference here is that D would be aware of which outcome is likely to be 
approved and would thus choose plan ‘B’. Information such as this confirms one of the 
many useful roles that the city planners undertake as part of their incentives towards 
brownfield redevelopment and renovation and illustrates the need for co-operation 
between D and CG throughout all of the conflicts in the brownfield renovation project. 
5.3.8 Overall Conflict 
The impact of the collaboration of developers and city planners to form positive 
relationships with positive developers in brownfield renovation and redevelopment has 
been displayed using GMCR in two key examples. The overall process can be 
represented as a single conflict which also reinforces the importance of positive 
interactions between the developer and the City. The conflict diagram in Figure 5.1 is 
condensed into a simpler, though less accurate, conflict diagram in Figure 5.6. 
  
Looking at the renovation of the Kaufman factory building into the useable 
residential space it is today as one large conflict with many DMs, it is not possible to 
develop one complete GMCR model which incorporates all of the elements of the three 
aforementioned conflicts. It is possible, however, to look at the costs and benefits 
associated by the actions taken by both the developer and city government. The main 
issues for the developer are the risk of liability associated with purchasing a 
contaminated property, the costs of remediation and the potential for future economic 
gain. For the city government, the issues include human health and social impacts of 
redeveloping a brownfield property as well as financial issues such as the potential for an 
increased tax base. For city governments, weighing the costs and benefits of these issues 









in the decision to aid developers with both incentives and guidance through the conflicts 
involved in the redevelopment is important to determining the best course of action.  
 
 
Table 5.13 briefly describes the advantages and disadvantages of the four 
incentives offered by the City of Waterloo for brownfield developments. The fourth 
incentive, Tax Incremental Financing (TIF), was not offered for the Kaufman renovation 
project as it was not in use in the City of Kitchener at the time the project was 
undertaken. However, TIF has come to be an important part of the City’s brownfield 
strategy. By allowing developers to save on their taxes after redeveloping or renovating a 
brownfield property, the developer is able to recoup remediation costs without any risk to 
the City. The strength of this program has made it a common incentive in both Canada 
and the USA. The first three incentives: rebates on building permits, waiving of 
development fees and HR incentives are a part of the Kitchener EDGE program aimed at 
urban renewal within the core of downtown Kitchener. While offering rebates on 
building permits and waiving development fees may be a loss of revenue for the City, it 
is outweighed both by the eventual increase in tax revenue caused by the ultimately 
completed project and by the financial stability of the developer who is thus more likely 
to successfully complete the project. The third incentive, HR, is a key factor in building 
positive relationships between the City and the developer (City of Kitchener, 2006). 
The decision made by a developer really comes down to the decision of whether or 
not to invest in a brownfield property as opposed to a greenfield property. As mentioned 
Table 5.13. Advantages and disadvantages to CG for offering incentives 
 
Incentive Advantage Disadvantage 
Rebate on building 
permits 
-Reduces costs to developer during final 
stage of renovation project 
 
-Lost revenue to City government 
Waiving of 
development fees 
-Reduces costs to developer during final 
stage of renovation project 
 
-Potential significant cost to the City 
government, especially if the renovation is 
lofts/apartments, etc. and requires a large 
increase in infrastructure 
HR Incentive 
-Reduce costs and time of project while 
improving relationship between the developer 
and the City government 
-Requires an investment of City resources 
towards a private developer 
TIF 
-Allows developer to save money after 
completing the project 
-Incentive does not need to be paid until 
project is completed 
-Temporary loss of tax revenue to the City 
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before, common issues include liability risk, remediation costs and financial potential. By 
offering financial incentives and assistance with the procedures involved in completing, 
the City of Kitchener greatly entices prospective developers to the region. The issue of 
liability risk is dependent upon the successful completion of a record of site condition 
(RSC) by the developer with the help of a qualified environmental consultant (MOE) and 
is out of the control of City governments. However, financial issues and zoning or 
property division issues that can keep developers from investing are well within the 
control of local governments. By allowing a city planner to work with the developer, the 
government/developer relationship becomes less adversarial as planners help the investor 
deal with the Committee of Adjustment and local interest groups, such as Heritage 
Kitchener. Certainly, observing the renovation of the Kaufman property as a large overall 
conflict, positive attitudes and working with developers to find better outcomes is an 
important step towards a successful renovation project. 
5.3.9 Conclusions 
The analysis of the key conflicts involved in the Kaufman renovation project 
illustrates the importance of positive attitudes and clear communication in brownfield 
renovation and redevelopment projects. By creating positive relationships with 
developers through financial incentive packages and guidance through the community’s 
various committees and advisory boards, brownfield projects are more likely to come to a 
successful end. Work by the City of Kitchener to provide clear information to developers 
about the needs of the committee of adjustment and Heritage Kitchener has a definite 
impact on the ability of the developers to create successful projects. The application of 
GMCR to the conflicts involved in the renovation of the former Kaufman footwear 
project also shows that when multiple DMs have related interests, it is possible to create 
solutions that satisfy the majority of DMs involved. 
The renovation of the Kaufman Shoe Company building in downtown Kitchener 
has been a social, environmental and financial success for both the developer and the 
City of Kitchener. It is the positive interaction of decision makers, as shown through 
illustrations with GMCR that has led to this outcome. 
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5.4 Eaton’s Lofts 
 A great amount of urban revitalization has occurred in the City of Kitchener as 
private developers have worked with the local government to redevelop vacant and 
unused properties and buildings. One of these properties, referred to as the Eaton’s Lofts, 
has been a subject of great interest to Kitchener residents. Unlike the successful 
renovation of the Kaufman factory, the Eaton’s lofts project has been marred by conflict 
between the developer and the tenants.  
Located near the corner of King St. and Frederick St. in downtown Kitchener, the 
Eaton’s Lofts developed after the Eaton’s retailer left the downtown in the 1990’s. The 
property was developed by Loren Drotos and individual units sold for as much as 
$299,000 with parking spots selling for as high as $20,000. With the considerable amount 
of investment that residents put into living at the Eaton’s complex, the problems that 
followed the completion of the problem were devastating. The inability of the Drotos 
family, who owned the condominium and acted as the property’s private developer, to 
ensure that proper repairs were completed on the building and that asbestos was removed 
from the building before residents moved in resulted in bad publicity for loft-style 
developments within the City of Kitchener. In fact, it was during updates to the 
unfinished project ordered by Justice James Ramsey that asbestos was found putting a 
further snag in the completion of the Eaton’s Loft project. Although the property is not a 
brownfield property by USEPA definition, the difficulties in the completion of its 
redevelopment speak to the issues affronting all brownfield properties (Caldwell, 2007, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c). 
5.4.1 Graph Model of the Eaton’s Loft Conflict 
The Drotos family herein referred to as ‘the developers’ purchased the property 
that would be known as the Eaton’s Lofts with the goal of creating high value residential 
units in the heart of the City of Kitchener. Riding on the popularity of downtown living 
in the Kitchener-Waterloo area the Eaton’s Lofts was initially a very successful project 
until complaints from residence about the incomplete building and the eventual discovery 
of asbestos in the walls of the residence derailed the project significantly. The residents, 
who worked together to battle the developer in court, are seen as one DM referred to as 
‘residents’. The DMs and options for this conflict are shown in tableau form for this 
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conflict found in Table 5.14. Here, the developer (D) may either settle out of court or 
fight the residents in court to avoid paying damages and performing repairs while the 
residents (R) can either fight the developer through the court or not. The City’s options 
are to help support residents in their legal battle through financial support or not. 
 
In Table 5.14, the 3 possible options, available to the three DMs combine to make 
a total of sixteen possible states. Observing the total set of possible states infeasible states 
can be seen and removed. Any states where the developer both maintains a legal battle 
and decides to settle out court are obviously infeasible. These states are marked in bold in 
Table 5.14, removed from the conflict model, thus leaving twelve feasible states. The 
integrated graph model of the Eaton’s Loft dispute is shown in Figure 5.7.  
 
Utilizing the integrated graph model in Figure 5.7 along with Nash and SEQ 
stability concepts it is possible to determine the stable outcomes of this conflict. In Table 












Table 5.14 Eaton’s Lofts conflict in option form 
DM Options States 
Developer 1. Settle out of court 






N N Y Y N N Y Y 
City Gov’t 3. Support residents 
N N N N Y Y Y Y 
State ID  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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form for all 8 states. Here, it can be seen that the status quo state, state 0 is not an 
equilibrium state. However, the only equilibria occur at state 1 and state 2 where the 
developer settles out of court without legal action or assistance from the City or where 
the Residents take legal action and no one else makes any actions. 
 
The movements available to the DMs in this conflict from the status quo, state 0, 
move the conflict from state 0 to state 2 through a UI, RR+(0) = {2}. If CG makes a 
strategic disimprovement, one that can be shown through the application of attitudes, it is 
possible to reach a state that is more preferred by all DMs to state 2. Assuming CG’s 
attitudes are such that eCG-CG = 0 and eCG-R = +, then the relational preferences and 
corresponding total relational replies are as shown in Table 5.16.  
 
In Table 5.17, the new analysis incorporating the aforementioned attitudes is 
given. In the presence of CG’s attitudes, the new relational equilibrium for the conflict is 
state 6 as the conflict can now evolve further. First, R makes a move from state 0 to state 
Table 5.16. Relational preferences 
Sets States 
RPCG-CG(s) S S S S S S S S 
RPCG-R(s) 
1, 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7 
5 1, 3, 5, 
6, 7 
1, 5, 7 0, 1, 2, 
3, 5, 6, 
7 




1, 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7 
5 1, 3, 5, 
6, 7 
1, 5, 7 0, 1, 2, 
3, 5, 6, 
7 
- 1, 3, 5, 
7 
1, 5 
RCG(s) 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 
TRRCG(s) - 5 6 7 0 - - - 
s 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Table 5.15 Eaton’s Lofts conflict in tableau form 
DM Stability 
Equilibria X X E X X E X X 
D’s stability Nash Nash SEQ SEQ Nash Nash U U 
D’s preferences 0 4 1 5 6 2 3 7 
D’s UIs   0 4   2 6 
R’s stability Nash Nash SEQ SEQ Nash Nash U U 
R’s Preferences 5 1 7 3 6 2 0 4 
R’s UIs   5 1   2 6 
CG’s stability Nash Nash U SEQ Nash Nash U U 
CG’s preferences 1 0 5 4 2 3 7 6 
CG’s UIs   1 0   3 2 
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2 and next CG moves from state 2 to 6 where CG supports R in their legal battle against 
D. Although state 1 is much more preferred for all three DMs, supporting R against D is 




Using GMCR it is possible to determine the actions that are needed and the types of 
attitudes necessary to produce these movements. By acting in a cooperative fashion 
towards R, it is possible that CG would act against their own preference not to spend in 
order to aid citizens, R. 
5.5 Summary 
The ability of the strategic decision support tool GMCR to illustrate the types of 
preferences, attitudes and actions that are needed to succeed in brownfield renovations is 
evident from the illustrations made in sections 5.3 and 5.4. With the knowledge of how 
DMs interact in these conflicts it may be possible to improve how brownfield regulations 
are structured to improve the way developers and local government collaborate in private 
brownfield renovations. In the following chapters, negotiations regarding the Kyoto 
Protocol are analyzed using systems methodologies. 
Table 5.17. Eaton’s Lofts conflict with attitudes in tableau form 
DM Stability 
Equilibria X X X X E X X X 
D’s stability Nash Nash U U Nash Nash U U 
D’s preferences 0 4 1 5 6 2 3 7 
D’s UIs   0 4   2 6 
R’s stability Nash Nash SEQ SEQ Nash Nash U U 
R’s Preferences 5 1 7 3 6 2 0 4 
R’s UIs    5 1   2 6 
CG’s stability RSEQ RNash RNash U U RSEQ RNash RNash 
CG’s preferences 1 0 5 4 2 3 7 6 
CG’s UIs 5   0 6 7   
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The application of systems tools to environmental conflicts is not limited to small 
scale problems such as individual negotiations regarding a contaminated property, the 
renovation of a former factory building or the management of water resources. 
Multiparty negotiations regarding the management of greenhouse gases through the 
Kyoto Protocol is modelled and analyzed using GMCR to determine the strategic moves 
and countermoves made by Russia in the negotiation of the protocol. 
6.2 Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is an amendment to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) which aims to reduce the emission of the gases 
that cause climate change.  The protocol was first signed in 1997, with distinct climate 
goals set for 2008-2012 (United Nations, 2007). During the first time period of the 
protocol, the signing nations negotiated to reduce their CO2 emissions to between -8% 
and +10% of 1990 levels. The protocol allows for the trading of emissions certificates by 
nations that exceed their reduction goals.  Details of the trading system were negotiated 
after the initial signing date, with the goal of determining how the trading of emissions 
permits would work (Karas, 2006; OECD, 1999). Russia was one of the countries most 
interested in the exchange of emissions permits. At the time the treaty was signed, Russia 
was suffering economically due to the recent dissolution of the Soviet Union (Karas, 
2006). As Russia was struggling to develop its capitalist-based industries and numerous 
factories were closed, it was apparent that Russia would have little trouble meeting the 
emissions guidelines it had negotiated for the protocol. In fact, due to the trading of 
emissions permits, Russia stood to make a significant windfall through its skilful 
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negotiation of the protocol (Karas, 2006). However, the potential to profit in this excess 
of ‘hot air’, as some referred to it, was dependent on a suitable market in which to sell the 
permits (Karas, 2006; OECD, 1999). Many speculated that the United States of America 
(USA) would be the most likely buyer of these permits due to the drastic targets set by 
the protocol on the USA and its rank as the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (Karas, 
2004; 2006).  
At the onset of the protocol, in 1997, American President Bill Clinton was a 
champion of the Kyoto Protocol (CNN, 1997). However, shortly after Vice-President 
Gore and Senator Lieberman signed the protocol, the Senate voted 95-0 to not become 
party to the protocol if it did not include limits on emissions of developing nations as 
well as industrialized nations (CNN, 1997; US Senate Legislation & Records, 1997).  
President Clinton never attempted to have the protocol ratified by the Senate and in 2001, 
recently-elected President George W. Bush declared that the USA would not join without 
China’s participation and questioned the science behind climate change (Whitehouse, 
2001). 
The USA’s refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol affected Russia both positively 
and negatively (Babicker, et al., 2002; Karas, 2006). Without the USA’s involvement, 
Russia became the largest emitter of greenhouse gases of the negotiating parties and 
whether the protocol would be put into force depended heavily on Russia (Babicker, et 
al., 2002). This was due to the protocol’s stipulation that 55 nations producing at least 
55% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions must ratify the Kyoto Protocol before it be 
put into force (Babicker, et al., 2002; United Nations, 2007).  Russia was now in a strong 
bargaining position to draw positive incentives from parties that wished the protocol to 
be implemented (Karas, 2006).  European nations, that had already signed the Kyoto 
Protocol and desired implementation, approached Russia with a plan to ease its entry into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Babicker, et al., 2002; Reuters, 2004; Reuters, 
2004a). It is reasonable to assume that Russia’s eventual decision to ratify the protocol on 
September 30, 2004 was due not to environmental concerns stipulated by Russia’s 
government but the potential for fiscal and political gain made from acting in coalition 
with members of the European Union (EU) (Babicker, et al., 2002; BBC, 2004; Karas, 
2006). In the following sections, the key concepts of the Graph Model for Conflict 
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Resolution and a methodology for examining coalitions are applied to the Kyoto Protocol 
to show how Russia’s ratification occurred with the intervention of the EU. The conflict 
between Russia, the United States and eventually the European Union, is analyzed in the 
following subsection, 6.3. 
6.3 Kyoto Protocol Conflict Between Russia and The USA 
 
At the onset of this conflict there were only two DMs from Russia’s point of 
view: Russia and the USA.  Both the USA and Russia had the option of ratifying the 
protocol in this conflict. Option form, developed by Howard (Howard, 1971), shows that 
states are created from the simple combinations of yes (Y) and no (N) for each DM’s 
given options.  Writing the Kyoto protocol conflict between the USA and Russia in 
option form, there are four states, numbered 0 to 3 for this conflict as shown in Table 6.1.  
 
A convenient way to write two-DM conflicts is using normal form, as shown in 
Table 6.2. This form is practical for displaying conflicts between two DMs and has been 
used before to analyze international conflicts. In this form, the structure of the game is 
altered such that both Russia and the USA have the mutually exclusive choices to either 
ratify (R) the protocol or decline (D). Each time both DMs choose an option, the result is 
referred to as a state. If both the USA and Russia, for example, chose to ratify the 
protocol, (R) then the resultant state would be RR as shown in the top left-hand corner of 
the Table 6.2. Again, there are four states in total, resulting from the combination of each 
DM’s strategies. 
 
Table 6.1. Option form of the Russia-USA Kyoto conflict 
Decision Maker - Option States 
USA – Ratify N Y N Y 
Russia – Ratify  N N Y Y 
State ID 0 1 2 3 
Table 6.2. Normal form of the Russia-USA Kyoto conflict 
 USA 
Russia 
Options R D 
R RR RD 
D DR DD 
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6.3.1 Amicable Ratification 
 
Before complications with the Senate and Congress kept the USA from ratifying 
the protocol, President Clinton had positioned the USA to follow through with the 
protocol (CNN, 1997; US Senate Legislation & Records, 1997). Russia’s ratification was 
important to the USA as China and developing nations were already unaccounted for in 
the protocol (CNN, 1997; US Senate Legislation & Records, 1997). As mentioned 
previously, Russia’s ability to negotiate its’ future emissions to 1990 levels left it with 
the potential for a surplus of emissions permits that could be sold to other nations. As the 
USA is the largest global emitter of greenhouses gases Russia desired that the USA ratify 
the protocol.  Without the USA, the demand for emissions permits would drop 
significantly and thus the potential profit would also diminish (OECD, 1999). The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that 
without the USA, the total value of Russia’s emissions permits could drop from $4.39B 
to $161M, a significant loss in profit (OECD, 1999). Thus, the ranking of states from 
most to least preferred for Russia was RR, DR, DD, RD and for the USA was RR, RD, 
DD, DR. Both DMs wanted to ratify the protocol with the other DM and not to ratify 
alone. Russia’s unilateral moves, as shown in Fig.1, correspond to moves between the 
two rows meaning that Russia has unilateral moves from RR to DR and from RD to DD, 
while the USA’s unilateral moves are represented as movements between the two 
columns meaning that the USA has unilateral moves from RR to RD and from DR to 
DD. 
Table 6.3. Tableau form of the Russia-USA Kyoto Protocol Conflict 
Equilibrium Equil X Equil X 
USA Stability Nash U Nash U 
USA RR RD DD DR 
Unilateral Improvements  RR  DD 
Russia Stability Nash U Nash U 
Russia RR DR DD RD 




In Table 6.3, the conflict is displayed in the tableau format suggested by Fraser 
and Hipel (Fraser and Hipel, 1979; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) to illustrate the stable states 
and equilibriums. In tableau form, the states are listed in order of preference from left to 
right for each DM with any unilateral movements from the given state listed below that 
state for the particular DM. Any states that have no unilateral improvements for a given 
DM are Nash stable for that DM from Definition 7. If the state is Nash stable, 
sequentially stable or unstable; Nash, Seq or U are written above the given state, 
respectively. States that are stable for all DMs are marked Equil for equilibrium and all 
non-equilibrium states are denoted by an X. 
Analyzing the stability of the states in the USA’s preference ordering, it is 
observed that states RR and DD are Nash stable as both states satisfy Definition 7. DD is 
Nash stable for USA∈N, DD∈S as )(DDRUSA+ =φ . State RD is unstable for the USA as it 
does not satisfy either Definition 7 or 8. By  
6.3.2 Changing Preferences of the USA 
After the US Senate unanimously voted not to ratify the protocol, President 
Clinton faced a mounting struggle to promote the importance of the protocol for the 
remainder of his time in office (Karas, 2006; US Senate Legislation & Records, 1997). 







Russian unilateral movements 
 
 
 RR  RD 
 
 
 DR  DD 
 
American unilateral movements 
 
Figure 6.1. Unilateral movements of Russia and USA.  
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the science and the legislation, the USA would not ratify the protocol (Whitehouse, 
2001). This caused a rearrangement of the USA’s preferences makes DD the only 
remaining equilibrium as shown in Table 6.4. 
 
 
During this period the conflict stayed at this new status quo, with new DMs 
moving into the dispute hoping to improve the chances of Russia ratifying the protocol 
(Karas, 2004; 2006). Whether or not Russia’s delay in endorsing the protocol following 
USA’s withdrawal was a strategic move to entice other nations to offer incentives for 
Russian ratification has been debated (Karas, 2006). Regardless of whether it was 
intended, Russia’s delay in ratification drew notice from nations that had committed to 
Kyoto and wanted it to come into force.  
6.3.3 The Introduction of the European Union to the Kyoto Protocol Conflict 
While the United Nations pleaded with Russia to ratify the protocol, a large 
number of EU member countries made efforts to persuade Russia to support the common 
good by helping to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force (AFP, 2004; Karas, 2006; 
Reuters, 2004a).  For Russia, the key reasons to join the protocol would be for its own 
political or fiscal gain (Karas, 2006).  What began to entice Russia into ratifying the 
Table 6.4. Tableau form of 2nd Russia-USA Kyoto Protocol conflict 
Equilibrium Equil X X X 
USA Stability Nash Nash U U 
USA DD RD DR RR 
Unilateral Improvements   DD RD 
Russia Stability Nash Seq Nash U 
Russia RR DR DD RD 
Unilateral Improvements  RR  DD 
 
 
Table 6.5. Option form of the expanded Kyoto Protocol conflict 
DM Option States 
USA Ratify N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Russia Ratify N N Y Y N N Y Y 
EU Entice Russia to Ratify N N N N Y Y Y Y 
State IDs 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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protocol was the move by the EU to help Russia move into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in exchange for Russian ratification (BBC, 2004; Karas, 2006; Reuters, 2004).   
Thus, a new conflict was formed between USA, Russia and the European Union 
(EU).  Table V displays the options of each DM as well as the list of all possible states in 
the conflict. The states have been renumbered and thus differ from those defined in Table 
6.1 of subsection 6.2. 
6.3.4 Preferences 
The Russian and USA preferences match the ones assigned to them in the Section 
III, Subsection B where the USA prefers not to ratify the protocol. Recalling this, it is 
noted that Russia prefers to ratify if it does not ratify alone.  This has been expanded to 
include a preference by Russia to ratify in the presence of EU incentives. As before the 
USA prefers not to ratify above all and it’s ranking of states from most to least preferred 
is the ordered set 0, 4, 6, 2, 1, 5, 7, 3. Russia’s ranking of preferences reflects its’ 
previous ranking of states from Section III, Subsection B as the ordered set 7, 3, 6, 5, 4, 
1, 0, 2. The EU’s preference ranking reflects a desire that both the USA and Russia ratify 
without EU incentive and a preference that if neither the USA and RUS ratify that no 
incentive be given. Thus the EU’s ordering of states is 3, 2, 1, 7, 6, 5, 0, 4.   
6.3.5 Unilateral Movement and Improvement Lists 
In Table 6.6 the unilateral movements for the USA, Russia and EU can be 
observed in the second, third and fourth columns while the improvements are displayed 
in columns five, six and seven respectively.  With information about preferences from 
Subsection A and information regarding how the DMs can move between states from 
Table 6.6, a stability analysis can be undertaken. 
 
Table 6.6. USA and Russia unilateral movements and improvements 
State RUS RRUS REU R+US R+RUS R+EU 
0 1 2 4 -- -- -- 
1 0 3 5 0 3 -- 
2 3 0 6 -- 0 -- 
3 2 1 7 2 -- -- 
4 5 6 0 -- 6 0 
5 4 7 1 4 7 1 
6 7 4 2 -- -- 2 
7 6 5 3 6 -- 3 
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Putting the conflict into tableau form, the dispute is analyzed for Nash and 
Sequential stability in Table 6.7. Below each state is a unilateral or coalition movement 
that the DM can move to.  Above each state is either ‘Nash’, ‘Seq’ or ‘U’ to denote 
whether the states are Nash stable, sequentially stable or unstable.  Above the top row of 
stability indicators is either E or X which represents whether the state is an equilibrium or 
not, respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 6.7, there are two equilibrium states:  states 0 and 6. State 0 
corresponds to the status quo where neither the USA nor Russia ratifies the protocol and 
the EU does not entice Russia’s ratification. This outcome is the starting point of this 
three DM conflict as the EU joined the conflict when both nations had not ratified. State 
6, the second equilibrium state, corresponds to EU enticement and Russia ratifying 
without the USA. Although this is a more preferable state for both the EU and Russia it is 
unreachable in this conflict model because neither the EU, nor Russia nor the USA has a 
unilateral move away from state 0.  Thus, when   all three DMs act independently there is 
no feasible path away from the status quo. By using a coalition analysis a feasible path 
can be determined to illustrate the importance of collaboration between the EU and 
Russia in this conflict. 
 
 
Table 6.7. Tableau form of the expanded Kyoto conflict 
 E X E X X X X X 
 Nash Nash Nash Nash U U U U 
USA 0 4 6 2 1 5 7 3 
     0 4 6 2 
 Nash Nash Nash U U Seq Nash U 
Russia 7 3 6 5 4 1 0 2 
    7 6 3  0 
 Nash Nash Nash Nash Seq U Nash U 
EU 3 2 1 7 6 5 0 4 




6.4 Coalition Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol Conflict 
Coalitions form in conflicts as DMs work together to achieve a more desired state 
for all coalition members. Previously, a coalition analysis for the Kyoto protocol was 
carried out by the OECD using environmental and economic costs and benefits as the 
only factors (OECD, 1999).  The results of this analysis showed that due to the high cost 
associated with environmental gain there was incentive for DMs to ‘free-ride’ by taking 
the environmental gains without any economic investment.  The coalition model defined 




In order to analyze coalitions, a separate set of solution concepts are needed to 
determine coalition stability and associated equilibria. Kilgour, et al. (2001), developed 
the concepts of coalition stability and improvement, while Inohara and Hipel (2008a) 
defined coalition solution concepts for Nash, general metarational, symmetric 
metarational and sequential stability.  
Table 6.8. Coalition movements and improvements 
State RA(x) RA++(x) 
0 2,4,6 6 
1 3,5,7 3 
2 0,4,6 -- 
3 1,5,7 -- 
4 0,2,6 6 
5 1,3,7 3, 7 
6 0,2,4 -- 
7 1,3,5 -- 
Table 6.9. Coalition Analysis in tableau form 
 E X E E X X X X 
 CN CN CN CN U U U U 
USA 0 4 6 2 1 5 7 3 
     0 4 6 2 
A CN CN CN CS CS U CN CN 
Russia 7 3 6 5 4 1 0 2 
    3,7 6 3,7 6  
 CN CS CN CN CN CS CN U 
EU 3 2 1 7 6 5 0 4 
   3   3,7 6 6 




Using Definitions 1 through 6, 11 and 12 from Chapter 2, a set of unilateral and 
coalition improvements and movements can be developed for the case where Russia and 
EU form a coalition. This coalition, called Coalition A, has its own set of movements and 
improvements.  From Definition 5 (i), at state 0, )0(RussiaR =2 and )0(EUR =4, thus both 2 
and 4 are coalition movements for Coalition A at 0.  By induction in Definition 5 (ii), as 
)4(RussiaR = )2(EUR =6, 6 is also a coalition movement for Coalition A from 0. Thus, the 
complete set of unilateral movements for Coalition A from is defined as the set 
}6,4,2{)0( =AR . From this list of movements, a set of coalition improvements as defined by 
Definition 11 are developed.  As 6 EURussia,f 0 while 2 EUf 0, 0 Russiaf 2 and 4 Russiaf 0, 0 EUf 4 
Russia
  4  5
  0 
 7 6



















Figure 6.3. Coalition movements for Russia and EU 
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the only coalition improvement for Coalition A from 0 is 6. Applying this methodology 
to set of states S a set of coalition movements and improvements are created in Table 6.8. 
Using the Russia-EU coalition A there are now three equilibriums 0, 2 and 6 
which represent the status quo, the state where Russia ratifies alone while the EU does 
not offer an incentive and where Russia ratifies while the EU does offer an incentive, 
respectively. 
Observing Figures 6.2 and 6.3, it can be seen that the formation of Coalition A 
creates a set of coalition movements that allows the EU and Russia to move between 
states in cooperative ways. 
Using these new movements to move to a mutually beneficial state, EU and 
Russia can move from the status quo at state 0 to state 6 where the EU offers the 
incentive and Russia ratifies the protocol. This move would be impossible without the 
creation of a stable coalition as seen in Figure 6.4. 
 
This cooperative move allows the conflict to move from a state that was at 
equilibrium previously and move to a more preferred equilibrium state through an 
equilibrium jump.  Equilibrium jumps, as defined by Kilgour, et al. (2001), are an 
important feature of coalition analysis which allows decision analysts to see the 














Fig. 6.4. State evolution through coalition move 
The coalition improvement is from 0 to 6. Infeasible steps are marked with a dashed arrow. Russia is denoted as RUS. 
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6.5 Summary 
As illustrated in the Kyoto Protocol conflict, the formation of coalitions between 
DMs can lead to positive results that may otherwise have not occurred. In the case of 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, a resolution that ensured Russian ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol in spite of USA withdrawal can be attributed to the formation of a Russia-EU 
coalition where both DMs worked together to move to a more desired equilibrium. The 
coalition methodologies applied here illustrate the importance of international 
cooperation in the area of energy and environmental policy as well as the importance of 
coalition analysis in conflict analysis. Such a systems methodology can be applied to 









In the preceding chapters, the conflict analysis methodology, the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution (GMCR), and associated coalition definitions are given, and GMCR 
is extended to include attitudes and applications to the fields of brownfield 
redevelopment and environmental management, providing analytical insight for 
brownfield negotiations. In Chapter 2, a detailed explanation of the graph model and 
coalition analysis is provided. Chapter 3 is focused on attitudes as defined within the 
framework of GMCR, accounting for variation within situations of a decision maker’s 
(DM’s) action motivated solely by positive self-interest and indifference towards fellow 
DMs. Brownfield decision models, indicators of social, environmental and economic 
brownfield presence and renewal, as well as characteristics of successful remediation are 
examined in Chapter 4. Using this literature review, a successful implementation of the 
GMCR decision support tool is presented in Chapter 5. 
The methodologies defined in Chapters 2 and 3 are applied to brownfield 
redevelopment conflicts, and an international environmental management dispute in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The application of the methodologies developed in Chapters 2 and 3 to 
brownfield redevelopment demonstrates that an understanding of coalitions and attitudes 
improves an eventual outcome with respect to property acquisition, remediation and 
redevelopment of brownfields for all involved stakeholders. In Chapters 6, coalitions are 
applied to a larger-scale multinational conflict, illustrating the breadth of application of 




7.1 Brownfield Redevelopment 
Brownfield conflicts are examined with respect to the current state of research 
and the application of conflict analysis methodologies to the issue of redevelopment in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The Chapter 4 overview summarizes literature in the areas of 
governmental regulation, ecological indices, human health, finances and social justice, 
contrasting the impact of brownfield presence and redevelopment on the urban landscape. 
Whereas Chapter 5 outlines the impact of various strategies, preferences, attitudes and 
coalitions on the outcome of existing brownfield problems, Chapter 4 provides a 
sociocultural basis for this research as studied by economists, environmentalists, urban 
planners and scientists. 
The application of conflict methodologies to brownfield redevelopment is an 
analytical tool for examining relationships among decision makers in the three stages of 
private brownfield redevelopment: acquisition, remediation selection, and 
redevelopment. Chapter 5’s implementation of GMCR and attitudes within the context of 
a property acquisition conflict demonstrates an increase in long-term brownfield 
redevelopment for a city when the city government decides against immediate gain in 
holding an indifferent attitude towards itself and a positive attitude towards the 
developer. Additional analysis of seller attitudes reveals that when the seller and city 
governmental preferences are significantly divergent, the application of attitudes cannot 
overcome their player-focussed preference structures towards a brownfield remediation 
conflict resolution.  
When formulating a remediation strategy, environmental contractors will 
determine acceptable contaminant levels on the brownfield site. Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment (MOE) guidelines ideally suggest generic standards which are independent 
of property for remediation of brownfields. However, in some circumstances remediating 
to the generic standards is physically or financially infeasible. In this case, environmental 
contractors will provide a site specific risk assessment (SSRA) to determine the risk of 
exposure to adults and children living on an affected property and perform remediation to 
the most relevant level of sensitivity based on proposed land use. The negotiations 
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involved in remediation, including property severance, benefit from the inclusion of 
knowledge provided by forming coalitions with city planners, as noted in Chapter 5. 
After the environmental risk assessment, the redevelopment construction includes 
interactions between developers, oversight committees, and city planners. In the case of 
the redevelopment of historic buildings in the City of Kitchener, the oversight committee 
is Heritage Kitchener. By forming positive relationships with city planners, as shown 
through the applications of attitudes and coalitions, who work in partnership with 
committees such as Heritage Kitchener, developers can make adjustments to 
redevelopment plans and avoid conflict. Within GMCR, a hypergame is used to show the 
repercussions that could occur if developers choose not to form positive working 
relationships with city officials to ease the approvals processes. 
The post-development conflict, also analyzed in Chapter 5, reveals the problem 
that city officials can find themselves in after a project is completed. Although cities may 
wish to support developers whose tax dollars provide income to the community, in cases 
where developers have not lived up to their contracts it is the duty of the local 
government to protect its citizens. Within Chapter 5, the positive attitudes that local 
government must hold towards its citizens and the positive self-interest held by the 
developer are examined and the resultant actions of the city and developer are explained 
using these attitudes in the case study of the Eaton’s Lofts in downtown Kitchener, 
Ontario. 
7.2 Main Contribution of Thesis 
The examination of brownfield conflict through the application of strategic 
conflict analysis tools represents a stark contrast to the economic and environmental 
decision tools used throughout the field of brownfield redevelopment. As with GMCR’s 
application to brownfield and environmental management problems within this thesis, 
previous applications of the graph model to environmental conflicts such as the Elmira 
groundwater conflict (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) and the Garrison Diversion Unit (Fang, et 
al., 1993) have proven successful in providing insights into why certain outcomes have 
occurred in this important subset of systems problems. The application of the graph 
model to the area of brownfield redevelopment projects illustrates the importance of the 
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relationship between the developer and the local government. When attitudes are 
positive, such that information is shared between DMs or when coalitions are formed so 
that actions can be made in conjunction with each coalition member, developers and local 
governments are able to reach positive win-win outcomes that satisfy the developers, 
local government and residents of the city. 
The implementation of attitudes within GMCR represents a significant 
contribution to the theory of strategic conflict analysis. Through the use of attitudes, non-
regular analyses can be undertaken without the necessity of rearranging a DM’s 
preferences, thus avoiding errors in the determination of new preferences while still 
allowing for a greater amount of insight and knowledge to be taken from the decision 
model. The application of GMCR to the conflicts within the analysis of the Kaufman 
Lofts redevelopment in Kitchener, Ontario illustrates how DMs’ attitudes can have 
significant impacts upon the final outcome of a conflict. In the analysis of brownfield 
conflicts, attitudes are applied through the framework of GMCR to illustrate how when 
local governments act with positive attitudes towards developers throughout the three 
steps of brownfield reuse outline in Chapter 5.  
7.3. Future Research 
 The formal modelling of attitudes is a strong systems tool used within the 
framework of GMCR to determine how a DM may act under conflict given a desire to act 
in ways other than just self-improvement with no concern for other DMs. Understanding 
how conflict outcomes change due to the attitudes DMs hold for each other provides 
powerful strategic insights. Using soft computing methods, such as fuzzy numbers, 
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